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Abstract
This paper constructs a North–South quality-ladder model in which foreign direct investment
(FDI) is determined by the endogenous location choice of firms, and examines analytically how
strengthening patent protection in the South affects welfare in the South. Strengthening patent pro-
tection increases the South’s welfare by enhancing innovation and FDI, but it also allows the firms
with patents to charge higher prices for their goods, which decreases welfare. However, the model
shows that the former positive welfare effect outweighs the latter negative effect. Moreover, intro-
ducing the strictest form of patent protection in the South, that is, harmonizing patent protection in
the South with that in the North, may maximize welfare in the South as well as in the North. Further,
a similar result can also be obtained in a nonscale effect model.
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1 Introduction
Recently, many developing countries have been encouraged to strengthen intellectual property rights
(IPR) protection. An agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPs
agreement) claims that all World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries should adopt a set of
minimum standards on IPR, including patents and copyrights. Strengthening IPR protection is often
a requirement for developing countries to enter the WTO. However, most developing countries fear
that stronger domestic protection of IPR may damage their economies.1 Empirical studies show that
strengthening IPR protection in developing countries tends to cause an income transfer from developing
countries that have few or no patents to developed countries, which have many patents.2 However, in
order to judge whether strengthening IPR protection in developing countries is beneficial or harmful in
practice, it is important to examine how strengthening IPR protection in developing countries affects
their welfare, not their income. That is, does strengthening IPR protection in developing countries harm
their welfare?
The present paper examines how strengthening patent protection in a developing country affects its
welfare, considering all the effects through changes in endogenous variables. To do this, we use a North–
South quality-ladder model in which both innovation and technology transfers are endogenous. In our
model, the main mode of technology transfer is assumed to be foreign direct investment (FDI). There are
types of technology transfer that occur from a developed country (hereafter referred to as the North) to a
developing country (hereafter, the South), such as FDI, licensing, illegal imitation, and outsourcing. In
particular, inward FDI is increasing greatly in developing countries. FDI data from the UNCTAD World
Investment Report show that inward FDI stock in developing countries increased at an annual rate of
1 A panel data study of the index of patent protection by Park (2008) shows that many developing countries, as well as
developed countries, strengthened patent protection between 1990 and 2005. For instance, Brazil, China, and India strengthened
patent protection within this period to about three times its average 1960–1990 level. However, the indexes of patent protection
of some developing countries in South-east Asia and Latin America remain below those of developed countries such as the U.S.
and Japan.
2McCalman (2001) estimated the income transfers brought about by patent harmonization as a result of the TRIPs agree-
ment. His results imply that only a few developed countries, including the U.S., could benefit from cross-country income
transfers by strengthening patent protection, whereas all other countries would experience income losses from TRIPs; for in-
stance, the net transfer from Brazil amounts to 28% of GDP. Moreover, Yang and Maskus (2001a) and Park and Lippoldt (2005)
examined how U.S. receipts of royalties and license fees depend on IPR protection in the recipient countries, and showed that
strengthening IPR protection has statistically significant positive influences on licensing receipts.
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about 10% from 1980 to 2007.
The present analysis obtains the following two main results. First, the model shows that strengthening
patent protection in the South enhances FDI and innovation, and raises the wage rate in the South. The
reason for these results is as follows. Strengthening patent protection in the South enhances FDI because
it enables multinationals to charge higher prices and obtain higher profits. Moreover, the enhancement
of FDI further promotes innovation in the North by reducing the labor demand of the production sectors
in the North and directing more labor resources to research and development (R&D). On the other hand,
strengthening patent protection in the South raises the wage rate in the South.
Second, using the results of the above positive analysis, the present model shows that strengthening
patent protection in the South increases welfare in both the South and the North. That is, we show that
strengthening patent protection in the South can be a Pareto-improving policy for the North and the
South. Moreover, we obtain the following important result for an assessment of global patent protection:
harmonizing patent protection policy in the South with that existing in the North— that is, applying
the strictest patent protection—can maximize welfare in the South. This result implies that, in contrast
to the developing countries’ apprehension that stronger IPR protection damages their welfare, patent
harmonization is beneficial to developing countries that have few patents.
In our model, strengthening patent protection in the South affects welfare through three channels,
as follows. The first channel is through enhancing innovation: strengthening patent protection promotes
innovation and consequently raises welfare. The second channel is through the change in nominal spend-
ing: as mentioned above, strengthening patent protection raises the wage rate in the South and thereby
increases the nominal spending of Southern consumers, which raises welfare in the South. By contrast,
strengthening patent protection lowers the wage rate in the North and thereby lowers the nominal spend-
ing of Northern consumers, which reduces welfare in the North. The third channel is through changing
the prices of goods: the sign of this effect is indeterminate because strengthening patent protection affects
the prices of goods positively and negatively. The third channel can be decomposed into the following
three effects. First, there is a welfare effect that occurs through promoting FDI: strengthening patent
protection lowers the prices of some goods by increasing the proportion of goods produced by multina-
tionals in the South, which produce cheaper goods than do the firms located in the North. Therefore, a
rise in the proportion of FDI firms raises welfare. The second welfare effect caused by the change in
prices occurs through raising the wage in the South: strengthening patent protection raises the wage rate
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in the South and enables production firms to charge higher prices for their goods by raising the marginal
costs of rival firms, which consequently reduces welfare. The third welfare effect occurs through re-
ducing competition: strengthening patent protection allows multinationals to charge higher prices for
their goods because it reduces competition with nonpatentees, which reduces welfare. As a result of this
analysis, we show that the positive welfare effects can outweigh the negative welfare effects.
In the theoretical literature on technology transfer, a number of studies have examined how strength-
ening IPR protection affects innovation and FDI. Such studies include those of Helpman (1993), Lai
(1998), Glass and Saggi (2002), Glass and Wu (2007), Mondal and Gupta (2008), and Dinopoulos and
Segerstrom (2010).3 However, with the exception of Helpman (1993), none of these authors conducted
complete analyses of welfare.4 Unlike these studies, our study analyzes the welfare effect of strengthen-
ing patent protection in the South by using a simple model with no transitional dynamics.5 Further, we
also conduct welfare analysis by using the extended model without scale effects; although the extended
model exhibits transitional dynamics, we can conduct a complete analysis of welfare in the same way as
did Helpman (1993), who evaluated the effect on welfare of marginally strengthening IPR protection.
One of the few studies dealing with the welfare effect of IPR protection in developing countries is
that of Helpman (1993), who conducted two welfare analyses: first, a welfare analysis in a North–South
model in which the only mode of technology transfer is illegal imitation; and second, a welfare analysis in
a model in which the means of technology transfer is FDI.6 The former analysis examined how lowering
the probability of imitation of Northern products by Southern firms, which is achieved by introducing
tighter IPR in the South, affects welfare levels in both the South and the North. The results showed that
tighter IPR reduces welfare in the South mainly by hampering innovation. The latter analysis, which is
more relevant to the present paper because it deals with FDI, showed a similar result to the first analysis
3As can FDI, licensing can play an important role in technology transfer in the development process, as has occurred in,
for example, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Some studies have constructed North–South growth models in which the mode of
technology transfer is not FDI but licensing; see, for example, Yang and Maskus (2001b), Tanaka et al. (2007), and Futagami
et al. (2007).
4 Although Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) conducted welfare analysis, theirs was limited to the comparison between
steady states.
5Although this feature of our model is based on some special assumptions, the policy implications of our model are useful
because few existing studies in this literature deal with the welfare effect of IPR protection.
6Extending the model of Helpman (1993), Grinols and Lin (2006) analyzed the welfare effect of strengthening patent
protection in the South. However, the equilibrium paths in their model are so complex that they rely on numerical analysis. In
addition, in contrast to the present model, their model does not include FDI.
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without FDI; that is, tighter IPR in the South necessarily reduces welfare in the South.
Why does the result of the present paper contrast with the pessimistic result from the FDI model of
Helpman? The main reason is that the present paper assumes that innovation is determined endogenously,
whereas Helpman’s FDI model assumes for simplicity that innovation is exogenous. By introducing the
endogenous determination of innovation, our model can capture an important positive welfare effect of
strengthening IPR protection, that is, the welfare effect that occurs through enhancing innovation, which
is not taken into account in Helpman’s FDI model. The main result of the present paper implies that
the negative conclusion regarding the welfare effect of strengthening patent protection in the South may
change significantly when the welfare effect that occurs through innovation is taken into consideration.
We briefly describe how patent protection is incorporated into our model. There are two instruments
of patent policy: patent length and patent breadth. Patent length refers to the duration for which a paten-
tee can sell the patented product monopolistically. Patent breadth refers to the scope of products that
patentees can prevent firms without patents from producing and selling. We focus on the effects of ex-
tending patent breadth to evaluate analytically the welfare effect of increasing patent protection in the
South. More concretely, in a quality-ladder model, patent breadth represents the degree of quality that
the government permits firms other than the patentee to produce and, thus, patent breadth determines
the markup charged by multinationals. Hence, in the present quality-ladder model, broadening patent
breadth operates as would raising the markup of multinationals; that is, broadening patent breadth al-
lows the multinationals to charge higher prices and obtain higher profits, which raises the number of
multinationals and increases both the labor demand and the wage rate in the South.7
In contrast to the present paper, which deals with optimal patent breadth, and unlike studies that
use the imitation rate as the parameter of IPR protection, some studies analyzed the effects of patent
7 The TRIPs agreement requires WTO member countries to strengthen patent protection not only in regard to patent length
but also in regard to patent breadth. According to Maskus (2000, pp. 21–22), TRIPs mandated that, in adjudicating process
patent infringement cases, the burden of proof is reversed; that is, the defendant must demonstrate that his or her process does
not infringe the plaintiff’s patent. In general, proving process infringement is difficult, and this reduces the scope of products
that firms without a patent can produce and sell, and the consequence of this is an extension of patent breadth. On the other
hand, TRIPs requires extending the coverage of products that are patentable and the strengthening of patent enforcement; WTO
member countries must extend patent protection to important areas of technology such as chemical products and processes,
pharmaceutical products and processes, and food products and they must make more effort to expose patent infringements. We
can interpret these requirements as strengthening patent protection in regard to patent breadth. See Maskus (2000, Ch. 2) for
details.
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length. Dinopoulos and Kottaridi (2008) focused their analysis on the effect of changing patent length.8
They analyzed the effects of patent harmonization, under which the strength of the South’s patent pro-
tection is raised to the level of the North’s patent protection, and obtained the important result that patent
harmonization raises the long-run growth rate and improves the relative wage in the South. However,
Dinopoulos and Kottaridi (2008) did not evaluate the welfare effects of strengthening patent protection
because of the complexity of their model with a finite patent length.9 Grossman and Lai (2004) also used
patent length as the policy instrument of patent policy. They analyzed why IPR tends to be better pro-
tected in the North than in the South by using a North–South model in which R&D is conducted in both
countries. However, they assumed quasilinear utility in order to conduct welfare analysis. Furthermore,
their model is not a growth model, unlike the present model and that of Dinopoulos and Kottaridi (2008).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model. In Section 3, we
derive the equilibrium path of the model and show that strengthening patent protection promotes both
innovation and FDI. In Section 4, we consider the effect of stronger patent protection on the welfare of
consumers in both the South and the North. In Section 5, we examine how R&D subsidies influence the
welfare effect of strengthening patent protection, and we investigate how the welfare effect of strength-
ening patent protection would change in a nonscale effect version of the model. In Section 6, we provide
concluding remarks.
2 The Model
We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model such that FDI is introduced into a quality-ladder model.
Our model has the same basic structure as that of Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch. 12).
8Most of the existing studies dealing with patent protection, such as that of Kwan and Lai (2003), use the imitation rate
as the parameter of patent protection. In contrast to these models that incorporate a constant imitation rate, which depends on
the degree of IPR protection determined by governments, the recent growth model of the endogenous strength of protection
constructed by Eicher and Garcı´a-Pen˜alosa (2008) assumes that private R&D firms can raise the degree of enforcement by
allocating labor to developing institutions that prevent the infringement of their IPR. They showed that endogenizing IPR
protection generates multiple equilibria; that is, there is a high-growth equilibrium with stronger IPR protection and a low-
growth equilibrium with weaker IPR protection.
9In theoretical analyses of patent length, the dynamic properties of the equilibrium paths tend to be complicated. For
example, Futagami and Iwaisako (2007) investigated analytically the characteristics of the equilibrium paths of an economy
incorporating a finite patent length and showed that, even if the production structure is a simple AK type, the equilibrium paths
exhibit oscillations.
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Consider an economy comprising two countries, the North and the South, which are denoted by N
and S, respectively. The population size of country i 2 fN;Sg is given by Li, and each agent supplies
one unit of his or her labor inelastically at each point in time. There is a continuum of goods, indexed
by ! 2 [0; 1], that are produced in the North or the South. Each product is classified by a number of
“generations” j = 0; 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ and each generation progresses one step ahead if innovation occurs in the
industry. Therefore, product ! of generation j can be produced after the jth innovation in industry !. As
we explain subsequently, innovation occurs as a result of successful R&D efforts by firms. We assume
that products of different generations have different “qualities”. The quality of product ! of generation
j is given by qj(!) = ¸j , where the increment in quality between generation j and j + 1, ¸ > 1, is
identical for all products. In addition, we assume that one unit of labor produces one unit of output in
each country and industry, irrespective of the generation number j. We choose our units appropriately so
that, at time t = 0, the generation number is zero and quality is unity for all goods.
2.1 Consumers
Consumers living in country i 2 fN;Sg have the following lifetime utility: Ui =
R1
0 e
¡½t log ui;tdt,
where ½ is a common subjective discount rate and log ui;t represents instantaneous utility at time t.
We specify the instantaneous utility function as log ui;t =
R 1
0 log
hP
j qj(!)d
i
j;t(!)
i
d!, where dij;t(!)
denotes the individual’s consumption of good ! of generation j at time t.10 The representative consumer
maximizes his or her lifetime utility subject to the following budget constraint:Z 1
0
e¡
R t
0 rsdsEi;tdt = Ai;0 +
Z 1
0
e¡
R t
0 rsdswi;tdt; (1)
where rt is the interest rate that consumers in both countries face at time t, Ai;0 is the initial asset holdings
of a consumer in country i, and wi;t denotes the wage in country i. The term Ei;t represents the flow of
spending at time t, which is given by Ei;t =
R 1
0
hP
j pj;t(!)d
i
j;t(!)
i
d!, where pj;t(!) is the price of
product ! of generation j at time t.
10In this model, we implicitly assume that the product with a quality level that lies between those of the latest generation
and the second-latest generation can be produced and consumed. However, as mentioned below in Subsection 2.2, because of
the pricing behavior of the firms holding the patent on the latest-generation product, only the product of the latest generation is
produced and consumed in each goods sector. Thus, for simplicity, we describe the instantaneous utility as if a product with a
quality level that lies between those of the latest generation and the second-latest generation could not be consumed because,
in equilibrium, consumers do not consume such a product.
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This consumer’s utility maximization problem can be solved in two stages. In the first stage, the
consumer allocates his or her spendingEi;t to maximize log ui;t, given prices at time t. To solve this static
problem, the consumer allocates identical expenditure shares to all products. Then, for each product,
the consumer chooses the single generation j = Jt(!) that carries the lowest quality-adjusted price
pj;t(!)=qj(!). This implies the following static demand function:
dij;t(!) =
8<:Ei;t=pj;t(!) for j = Jt(!);0 otherwise:
In the second stage, the consumer chooses the time pattern of spending to maximize his or her lifetime
utility. Such intertemporal utility maximization requires that _Ei;t=Ei;t = rt ¡ ½. By treating aggregate
spending as the numeraire, we normalize Et ´ EN;tLN + ES;tLS = 1 for all t so that the interest rate
rt always corresponds to the subjective discount rate ½.11
2.2 Production
We assume that each economy has a single primary production factor, namely labor. The amounts of
total labor supplied in the North and the South are constant and are denoted by LN and LS , respectively.
As is the case in most related studies, we assume that labor is immobile between the North and the
South. Labor is devoted to the production of goods in both the North and the South. In addition, in
the North, labor is devoted to innovative activities to develop a higher quality product. We assume that
state-of-the-art products cannot be invented in the South.
If a Northern firm succeeds in inventing a state-of-the-art good, it can take out a patent for the good
in both countries and supply the good monopolistically. In contrast to the typical setting adopted by, for
example, Grossman and Helpman (1991), we assume that firms in country i 2 fN;Sg other than the
inventor of the latest-generation product have the technological capacity to make a product with a level
of quality that lies between those of the latest generation and the second-latest generation by imitating
the product without undertaking R&D if and only if the inventor is located in country i. However, the
existence of the patent legally guards the inventor from imitation. Thus, as mentioned below, the highest
level of product quality that other firms can produce and sell legally depends on the degree of patent
protection in the country.
11This normalization is convenient for examining the dynamic behavior of the economy. See Grossman and Helpman (1991,
Ch. 12).
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In the present paper, we assume that the inventor of a latest-generation product can select the location
of production; that is, the firm determines whether to produce the good in the North or shift production
to the South by undertaking FDI. In particular, we assume that the Northern firm, which is the inventor
of a latest-generation product, can shift production from the North to the South instantaneously and at
no cost if the firm chooses to undertake FDI.12 If the firm elects to shift production to the South, it can
use Southern labor, which is cheaper than Northern labor. This allows the firm to obtain higher profits at
each point in time. However, a firm that chooses to undertake FDI faces more intense competition from
potential rivals than does a patentee located in the North. This is because patent protection is assumed to
be weaker in the South than in the North. We assume that a firm can freely export its product from one
country to the other without incurring transportation costs or facing tariffs.
Before considering how patentees decide whether to undertake FDI, we must consider how govern-
ments protect patents in the North and the South. Generally, there are two policy instruments influencing
the degree of patent protection. One is the patent length, which determines for how long the patentee can
produce and sell the product exclusively. The other is the patent breadth, which determines the scope
of products that the patentee can prevent other firms from producing and selling. In the quality-ladder
model, because products of different qualities within the same product line are perfect substitutes, patent
breadth represents the degree of quality that the government permits other producers to produce.13 In
practice, governments control both policy variables. However, for simplicity, we assume that the patent
length is fixed and infinite and that governments control the degree of patent protection by using only the
patent breadth.14
12 In similar studies of FDI, Lai (1998) and Glass and Wu (2007) make a similar assumption. We can extend the model to
include the cost of FDI. However, as long as the cost of FDI is small, introducing such a cost into the model would not change
the result that strengthening patent protection in the South can improve the welfare of consumers in the North and the South.
13Strictly speaking, the concept of patent breadth includes leading breadth and lagging breadth. Leading breadth specifies the
level of superiority of a product (compared with the patented product) that producers without the patent are legally permitted
to produce and sell. Lagging breadth specifies how inferior a product must be compared with the patented product for the
producers without the patent to legally produce and sell it. The definition of patent breadth used in this paper corresponds to
lagging breadth. O’Donoghue and Zweimu¨ller (2004) examined how leading breadth affects innovation and welfare in a closed
economy. On the other hand, similarly to us, Li (2001) analyzed the effect on innovation of lagging breadth in a quality-ladder
model. However, he analyzed a closed economy.
14Judd (1985), Iwaisako and Futagami (2003), and Futagami and Iwaisako (2007) examined how patent length affects social
welfare. As shown by Futagami and Iwaisako (2007), under the assumption of finite patent length, the equilibrium paths are
complicated.
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In the present paper, we incorporate patent breadth as follows. When the state-of-the-art quality of
product ! is given by qj(!), firms in country i other than the patentee of the state-of-the-art-quality
product cannot legally produce product ! with a higher quality than qj(!)=¯i, where ¯i 2 [1; ¸]. Then,
¯i can be interpreted as representing the patent breadth in country i. In this setting, a higher ¯i implies a
broader patent breadth: if ¯i is equal to ¸, then patent protection in country i is at its maximum; if ¯i is
equal to unity, then patent protection in country i is nonexistent.15
Under the rules of patent policy, the pricing strategy of a firm operating in country i depends on the
patent breadth in that country. The optimal price level for the firm holding the patent for a state-of-the-
art good is such that the other firms cannot earn positive profit by entering the market for that good.
That is, the leader firm chooses to adopt a limit pricing strategy. More concretely, the patentee of the
latest generation of product !, the quality of which is equal to qj(!), adopts a pricing strategy such that
the quality-adjusted price of the good is no higher than the quality-adjusted price charged by the other
producers. If the patentee is operating in country i, the other producers can legally produce product
! with quality of no more than qj(!)=¯i. Therefore, if the patentee charges a price p that satisfies
p=qj(!) · p0=[qj(!)=¯i], where p0 denotes the price set by the other producers, then the patentee can
exclude the other producers from the market. Because the lowest price that the other producers can
charge is equal to their marginal cost, the limit price of the patentee is given by p = ¯iMC, where
MC denotes the marginal cost of the other firms. This implies that a greater patent breadth enables the
patentee to charge a higher price; in particular, when ¯i takes its highest value, ¸, the patentee can raise
the price to ¸MC, whereas, when ¯i takes its lowest value, unity, the patentee must lower the price to
the level of marginal cost.16
Under the patent breadth policy described above, we derive the optimal pricing strategy and the profit
of the patent holders producing in the North and the South. In the rest of the paper, we refer to patent
holders producing in the North as “Northern leaders” and refer to patent holders shifting production
15We can consider a patent breadth that is broader than ¸. However, ¯i > ¸ implies that the patent for the state-of-the-art-
quality product prevents the production of the good of the second-latest generation in the same product line; that is, the patent
prevents production of the product invented by the previous innovator. Such a large patent breadth seems unrealistic. Thus, in
our analysis, we assume that the patent breadth implied by ¯i = ¸ is the strictest form of patent protection.
16Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) assumed that the patent authority could raise patentee profits by increasing patent breadth.
Hence, they represented the level of patent breadth by the size of the profit flow. Similarly, Goh and Olivier (2002) assumed
that the patent authority could indirectly raise the legal marginal cost of producing a patented good illegally by increasing patent
breadth. Thus, they represented the level of patent breadth by the scale of this legal cost.
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to the South as “multinationals”. First, let us consider the pricing behavior of Northern leaders. We
assume that patent protection is strictest in the North; that is, patent breadth is at its highest: ¯N = ¸.
Then, Northern firms other than the patent holder of the latest-generation product ! are prohibited from
producing product ! at a quality level exceeding that of the second-latest generation product. Therefore,
the strongest potential rival to the patent holder of the latest-generation product ! is necessarily the patent
holder of the second-latest-generation product that chooses to operate in the South. This implies that the
marginal cost of the strongest rival is equal to the wage in the South, wS;t. Thus, the optimal strategy
of the patentees of the latest-generation product that decide to produce their goods in the North is to set
their prices to pN;t = ¸wS;t. Hence, the instantaneous profit of Northern leaders is:
¼N;t = (¸wS;t ¡ wN;t) 1
¸wS;t
= 1¡ wN;t
¸wS;t
: (2)
Second, let us consider the pricing behavior of multinationals. If patent protection is strong enough
in the South, as well as in the North, then the optimal price for multinationals in the South, pF;t, is the
same as that of Northern firms: pF;t = ¸wS;t. However, patent breadth may be lower in the South than
in the North. Suppose that patent breadth in the South ¯S takes a value of ¯ 2 [1; ¸]. That is, a Southern
firm other than the multinational of industry ! is permitted to produce product ! at a quality of qj(!)=¯
when the quality of the state-of-the-art good produced by the multinational is given by qj(!). Then,
multinationals are obliged to cut their prices to pF;t = ¯wS;t(· ¸wS;t), which is lower than pN;t, unless
there is maximum patent protection in the South.17 The price that multinationals can charge depends
on the extent of patent breadth in the South, as argued by Goh and Olivier (2002). If the Southern
government increases patent breadth, Southern firms other than multinationals can produce only lower
quality products. Consequently, multinationals can charge a higher price the greater patent breadth is
extended, that is, when patent protection becomes stricter in the South. From the pricing rule, the profit
17As mentioned above, production at a quality level beyond the patent breadth specified in each country is assumed to be
prohibited effectively in each country. Moreover, we assume that products can be distributed and sold freely in both countries;
this assumption is supported by evidence of parallel imports for many products. Therefore, multinationals cannot charge a
higher price in the North than in the South; if they charge a higher price, the other firms can sell the products that they buy from
multinationals to consumers in the North at a lower price than that charged by multinationals in the North, as a consequence of
which multinationals would lose sales in the North. Thus, multinationals are obliged to cut their price in the Northern market
to the price level prevailing in the South, ¯wS;t.
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flow of multinationals is given by:
¼F;t = (¯wS;t ¡ wS;t) 1
¯wS;t
= 1¡ 1
¯
(¸ ¼N;t): (3)
As this equation shows, the higher is ¯, the greater is the profit flow to multinationals. Consequently, the
stronger is patent protection in the South, the greater is the incentive to shift production to the South.
2.3 R&D and FDI
Next, we consider the behavior of R&D firms. Following Grossman and Helpman (1991), we assume
the following R&D process: if a Northern firm devotes aN ~I units of Northern labor for a time interval
of length dt to research on product !, it succeeds in developing the next generation product ! with
probability ~Idt. In other words, ~I represents the instantaneous probability of success in R&D. Although
R&D firms can choose their levels of R&D, investing in R&D imposes on R&D firms labor costs that are
proportional to ~I . If a firm succeeds in developing the new generation of a good, then it can take out a
patent for that generation of product. For a finite size of R&D activities in equilibrium, the expected gain
from R&D must not exceed the cost of R&D. Thus, letting vN;t denote the market value of the patent,
we have:
vN;t · wN;taN with equality if It > 0; (4)
where It denotes the innovation rate in the economy at time t, which is common to all industries.
Once a Northern firm succeeds in inventing a new-generation good, the firm can become a multina-
tional by shifting production to the South at no cost. Therefore, as long as both Northern leader firms
and multinationals exist in equilibrium, the market values of these firms are equal; that is, the following
equality holds at each point in time:
vN;t = vF;t; (5)
where vF;t denotes the market value of multinationals.
Next, we consider no-arbitrage conditions. The shareholders of a Northern leader firm earn dividends
¼N;tdt and capital gains _vN;tdt over a time interval of length dt. Moreover, the Northern leader firm is
exposed to the risk of being leapfrogged by the development of the next-generation good by another
Northern firm at the innovation rate It over that time interval. Thus, shareholders face making a capital
loss of vN;t with probability Itdt. Therefore, we obtain the following no-arbitrage condition between the
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stock of the patentee of a state-of-the-art product in the Northern market and a riskless asset:18
rtvN;t = ¼N;t + _vN;t ¡ ItvN;t: (6)
The shareholders of a multinational earn dividends ¼F;tdt and capital gains _vF;tdt over a time interval of
length dt. The multinational is also exposed to the risk of being leapfrogged by a Northern firm at the
innovation rate It. Thus, its shareholders face making a capital loss of vF;t with probability Itdt. The
no-arbitrage condition between the stock of a multinational and a riskless asset is:
rtvF;t = ¼F;t + _vF;t ¡ ItvF;t: (7)
2.4 The Labor Market
First, we consider the labor market in the South. Southern labor is demanded for production by multina-
tionals that have patents for their state-of-the-art products. We let nF;t denote the measure of industries
in which multinationals produce these state-of-the-art products. Because each multinational demands
1=(¯wS;t) units of Southern labor, the aggregate labor demand of multinationals is nF;t=(¯wS;t). There-
fore, the labor market clearing condition in the South is:
nF;t
¯wS;t
= LS : (8)
In the North, labor is devoted not only to production but also to R&D activities. Letting nN;t represent
the measure of industries in which Northern firms produce the state-of-the-art-quality products, the labor
demand for production in the North is given by nN;t=(¸wS;t). In addition, because R&D firms target all
goods, the labor demand for R&D activities is given by aNIt(nF;t + nN;t). Because nF;t + nN;t = 1,
the labor market clearing condition in the North is:
nN;t
¸wS;t
+ aNIt = LN : (9)
3 Market Equilibrium Paths
In this section, we derive the equilibrium paths of both economies. That is, we explain the determination
of the measure of firms choosing to undertake FDI, nF;t, the wage rates in the South and the North, wS;t
18If the Northern firm shifts production to the South and becomes a multinational, the gain is (vF;t ¡ vN;t); however, this is
zero from (5). Hence, even if we allow Northern firms to choose their FDI, the no-arbitrage condition remains unchanged.
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and wN;t, and the innovation rate, It. As shown in this section, our model has no transitional dynamics
and, thus, these variables are constant over time.
First, we consider the equilibrium determination of FDI. From (5), the market values of Northern
leaders and multinationals are equal at each point in time. Therefore, in what follows, we let vt denote
the market value of all firms; that is, vt ´ vN;t = vF;t. Because (5) holds at each point in time, we obtain
_vF;t=vF;t = _vN;t=vN;t. Substituting the no-arbitrage conditions (6) and (7) into this equation yields:
¼F;t = ¼N;t: (10)
Using (2) and (3), the equilibrium condition for FDI, (10) requires the following relationship between
wN;t and wS;t:
wS;t =
¯
¸
wN;t: (11)
This means that the relative wage in the South, wS;t=wN;t equals ¯=¸ 2 [1=¸; 1] and is an increasing
function of ¯.19 The reason is as follows. Greater patent breadth in the South (a higher ¯) guarantees
multinationals higher profits, as shown by (3). Moreover, because multinationals and Northern leaders
must earn equal profits, greater patent breadth in the South must also raise the profits of Northern leaders.
In order for the profits of Northern leaders to be higher, the total production cost of Northern leaders must
be lower because their revenue is fixed. The total production cost of Northern leaders, which is equal to
wN;t=(¸wS;t), is inversely proportional to the relative wage in the South and, hence, the relative wage in
the South must be increasing with ¯.
Second, from the condition for labor market equilibrium in the South, (8), the relationship between
19 The upper limit of the relative Northern wage rate implied by this model is determined by ¸. However, this level is
probably unrealistically low, given a plausible estimate of ¸; related literature, such as the study of S¸ener (2008), suggests that
¸ is between 1:05 and 1:4. This is a common feature of quality-ladder North–South models, as explained by Gustafsson and
Segerstrom (2010). In the quality-ladder North-South model, the production of goods that have been imitated in the South can
move back to the North due to successful innovation by a Northern firm, and therefore, the price charged by the Northern firm
becomes ¸wS , which depends on the Southern wage rate. Furthermore, it must not be lower than the Northern wage rate, wN
in order to guarantee positive profit for Northern innovators, and thus this imposes the upper limit of the Northern relative wage
rate: ¸ > wN=wS . Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010) released the relative wage from the condition by utilizing a variety-
expansion North-South model, where the production of goods that have been imitated in the South cannot move back to the
North by Northern firms’ innovation. Moreover, they showed that introducing the differences in R&D technologies between
innovation in the North and imitation in the South into the models, the model can account for an arbitrarily large Northern
relative wage.
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the measure of multinationals and the wage rate in the South is positive as follows:
nF;t = ¯LSwS;t: (12)
This is because a rise in the wage in the South raises the price of the good of a multinational, pF;t =
¯wS;t, which reduces the demand for the labor used to produce this good, 1=(¯wS;t). The decrease in
labor demand in the South enables more firms to conduct FDI and increases nF;t. In the same way,
strengthening patent protection in the South increases the measure of multinationals.
Third, we consider the relationship between the innovation rate, It, and the wage rate in the South,
wS;t. By substituting nF;t + nN;t = 1 and (12) into the condition for the clearing of the Northern labor
market (9), we obtain the innovation rate as follows:
It =
LN
aN
¡ 1¡ nF;t
aN¸wS;t
=
LN + (¯=¸)LS
aN
¡ 1
aN¸wS;t
: (13)
These expressions show that the relationship between It and wS;t is positive.
Next, by using the expressions derived so far, we derive the equilibrium value of a firm, vt. As long
as the innovation rate is positive, (4) holds with equality: wN;t = vt=aN . By substituting this, (3), (11),
and (13) into (7), we obtain the following equilibrium dynamics of vt: _vt =
h
LN+(¯=¸)LS
aN
+ ½
i
vt ¡ 1.
This differential equation has the unique steady state, v, which is given by:
v =
aN
LN + (¯=¸)LS + ½aN
: (14)
This unique steady state v is unstable and, therefore, vt diverges to positive or negative infinity unless vt
is v. Hence, the equilibrium value of vt must immediately jump to v at the initial point in time, because
vt is a jump variable. Because vt is constant over time, we can show that the other variables are also
constant over time; that is, our North–South model economy has no transitional dynamics. However, its
tractability enables us to use the model for welfare analysis.20
20 There are two straightforward ways to extend the model. One is to allow Southern firms to copy the technology of
multinationals. Assuming this would make the model more realistic because, then, Southern firms other than multinationals
could produce goods. However, this extension injects transitional dynamics into the model because the measure of goods
imitated and produced by Southern firms is a state variable. This complicates the equilibrium path and makes welfare analysis
less tractable. The other possible extension is to introduce a finite patent length as in, for example, Dinopoulos and Kottaridi
(2008). The introduction of a finite patent length would affect the welfare effects of raising patent breadth and might change
our welfare results. This would also inject into the model transitional dynamics, perhaps including oscillations, as Judd (1985)
and Futagami and Iwaisako (2007) found. Hence, this extension would make welfare analysis far more difficult.
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Note that v depends negatively on ¯, as shown in (14). This is because strengthening patent protec-
tion causes capital losses to rise as leapfrogging by other firms increases because of the promotion of
innovation.
Using the free entry condition, wN;t = vt=aN , and (11), we can compute the following equilibrium
wage rates in the North and South, which are constant over time:
wN =
1
LN + (¯=¸)LS + ½aN
; (15)
wS =
¯=¸
LN + (¯=¸)LS + ½aN
; (16)
where wN and wS are the equilibrium values of wN;t and wS;t, respectively. In the rest of the paper, the
variables without the subscript “t” represent equilibrium values. From (15) and (16), we can prove the
following proposition.
Proposition 1. Strengthening patent protection in the South raises the wage rate in the South and lowers
the wage rate in the North.
Proposition 1 can be interpreted as follows. As shown by (14), strengthening patent protection en-
hances innovation and therefore reduces the value of Northern firms and multinationals. From the condi-
tion for zero profit in R&D, the reduction in the reward for innovation must bring about a decrease in the
cost of R&D, which lowers the wage in the North. On the other hand, as shown by (11), strengthening
patent protection in the South raises the relative wage in the South. Because the increase in the relative
wage of the South is sufficiently large to exceed the decrease in the wage in the North, the wage in the
South must increase.
By substituting (16) into (12) and (13), we can derive the equilibrium values of nF;t and It as follows:
nF =
(¯2=¸)LS
LN + (¯=¸)LS + ½aN
; (17)
I =
¯ ¡ 1
¯
LN + (¯=¸)LS
aN
¡ ½
¯
: (18)
Differentiating (17) and (18) with respect to ¯ yields:
dnF
d¯
=
(¯=¸)LS
LN + (¯=¸)LS + ½aN
·
2¡ (¯=¸)LS
LN + (¯=¸)LS + ½aN
¸
> 0;
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dI
d¯
=
1
¯2
µ
LN
aN
+ ½
¶
+
LS
¸aN
> 0: (19)
Therefore, we can show that both nF and I are increasing functions of ¯. Consequently, strengthening
patent protection in the South necessarily promotes FDI and innovation in the North.
Proposition 2. Strengthening patent protection in the South promotes both innovation and FDI.
How can we interpret Proposition 2? As Proposition 1 shows, strengthening patent protection raises
the wage in the South. Therefore, strengthening patent protection raises the price of a good produced by
a multinational, pF = ¯wS , and thereby reduces the demand for the labor used to produce this good,
1=(¯wS). Consequently, to keep the Southern labor market in equilibrium, more firms must become
multinationals and shift production to the South than before the policy change. In addition, strengthening
patent protection raises the wage in the South, thereby raising the price of a good produced by a Northern
leader, pN = ¸wS , and thus reducing the demand for the labor used to produce this good, 1=(¸wS).
Because of both the decrease in labor demand by Northern leaders and the increased production shift to
the South, stronger patent protection in the South decreases total demand for the labor used to produce
goods in the North. Consequently, stronger patent protection increases labor demand for R&D activity
and raises the equilibrium innovation rate.21
Our finding that strengthening patent protection in the South enhances FDI is consistent with empiri-
cal results. For example, Lee and Mansfield (1996) estimated the relationship between the volume of FDI
flows and the strength of IPR protection, and found that they are positively correlated. A number of the-
oretical studies contain results similar to ours: Vishwasrao (1994) and ˇZigic´ (1998) showed that weaker
patent protection in the South may reduce technology transfers in a partial equilibrium. Lai (1998) and
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) obtained this result in a dynamic general equilibrium model.22
21 We implicitly assume the existence of an interior solution, in which 0 < nF < 1 and I > 0. As discussed in Appendix
C, 0 < nF < 1 is guaranteed if the parameters satisfy (¸ ¡ 1)LS < LN + ½aN . Further, assuming that ¯ > ¯min, where
¯min ´ 2¡1(1 ¡ ¸LN=LS) +
p
2¡2(1¡ ¸LN=LS)2 + ¸(LN + ½aN )=LS ; and (¸ ¡ 1)(LN + LS) > ½aN guarantees
I > 0. In the rest of the paper, we focus on the interior solution by assuming that these parameter conditions are satisfied.
22In contrast, Glass and Saggi (2002) showed that strengthening IPR protection impedes innovation and FDI in a dynamic
general equilibrium. The dynamic general equilibrium results probably differ because of differences in assumptions about
imitation and IPR protection; like us, Lai (1998) and Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010), assume that imitation is costless,
whereas Glass and Saggi (2002) assume that imitation is costly and that strengthening IPR protection increases the cost of
imitation.
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4 Welfare Analysis
In the previous section, we showed that strengthening patent protection raises the relative wage in the
South. However, the Southern government’s main concern is the welfare of its consumers: if strengthen-
ing patent protection in the South improves the South’s welfare, a Southern government would be keen
to implement the policy. Otherwise, it has an incentive to relax patent protection. Thus, in this section,
we examine the welfare effects of strengthening patent protection in the South.
First, we derive the spending of the representative consumer living in country i 2 fN;Sg. As
mentioned in Subsection 2.1, because we treat total spending as the numeraire, that is, Et = 1 for
all t, the interest rate is equal to the subjective discount rate, rt = ½. Given the intertemporal utility
maximization of each consumer, the per capita spending of a consumer living in any country is constant
over time. Therefore, we let Ei denote the spending of a consumer in country i. Because spending
levels and the wage rate in each country are constant over time, the intertemporal budget constraint (1)
is reduced to Ei = ½Ai;0 + wi for i 2 fN;Sg. Multiplying both sides of these budget constraints
by the population and adding the constraints yields ½(AN;0LN + AS;0LS) + wNLN + wSLS = 1,
where we use Et ´ EN;tLN + ES;tLS = 1. Letting A0 denote the total initial asset holdings, that is,
A0 ´ AN;0LN + AS;0LS , we can derive the value of A0 as follows: A0 = [1 ¡ (wNLN + wSLS)]=½.
Because country i’s share of asset holdings must be given as an initial condition, we let ³ 2 [0; 1] denote
the share of assets held by Northern consumers, that is, ³ ´ AN;0LN=A0.23 By substituting these
relationships into Ei, we obtain the following equilibrium values of EN and ES :
EN = ³
1¡ wSLS
LN
+ (1¡ ³)wN ; (20)
ES = (1¡ ³)1¡ wNLN
LS
+ ³wS : (21)
Next, we rewrite the instantaneous utility as follows:
log ui;t =
Z 1
0
log ¸Jt(!)dit(!)d! = (log ¸)
Z 1
0
Jt(!)d! +
Z 1
0
log dit(!)d!: (22)
Because the latest generation of a product sells for the lowest quality-adjusted price in the product line,
Jt(!) corresponds to the generation number of the latest generation of product !. Thus, the first term of
23 When the share of assets held by Southern consumers (1 ¡ ³) equals (¯ ¡ 1)(¯=¸)LS=(½aN )(> 0), balanced trade is
obtained; that is, (1¡ nF )ESLS = nFENLN .
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(22) is equal to log ¸ multiplied by the total number of innovations obtained in all industries by time t.
Because the rate of innovation is constant over time in our model, we can rewrite this term as:
(log ¸)
Z 1
0
Jt(!)d! = (log ¸)It: (23)
The second term of (22) can be rewritten as follows: R 10 log dit(!)d! = nF log diF;t + (1¡ nF ) log diN;t,
where diF;t and diN;t denote the demand for goods produced by multinationals and Northern leaders,
respectively. By using diF;t = Ei=pF = Ei=(¯wS) and diN;t = Ei=pN = Ei=(¸wS), we obtain:Z 1
0
log dit(!)d! = logEi ¡ logwS ¡ (log ¯)nF ¡ (log ¸)(1¡ nF ): (24)
As shown above, Ei, wS , nF , and I are all constant on the equilibrium path. Hence, from (22)–(24),
(log ¸)I represents the utility growth rate. Substituting (22)–(24) into the lifetime utility function, we
obtain the welfare of each consumer in country i 2 fN;Sg as follows:
Ui(¯) =
1
½
·
log ¸
½
I + logEi ¡ logwS ¡ (log ¯)nF ¡ (log ¸)(1¡ nF )
¸
; (25)
where Ui(¯) denotes the welfare of each consumer in country i when patent breadth in the South is ¯.
This shows that the welfare of an individual depends on the innovation rate, nominal spending, the wage
in the South, which in turn determines the prices of goods, the measure of multinationals, and patent
breadth in the South. The welfare levels of a Northern individual and a Southern individual differ only
because their nominal spending, Ei, differs.
To determine whether increasing patent breadth in the South raises welfare, we differentiate (25)
with respect to breadth ¯. The derivative of Ui(¯) is given by:
dUi(¯)
d¯
=
1
½
n log ¸
½
dI
d¯| {z }
innovation-enhancing effect
(+)
+
1
Ei
dEi
d¯| {z }
nominal spending effect
(+) or (–)
+
h
(log ¸¡ log ¯) dnF
d¯| {z }
FDI-promoting effect
(+)
¡ 1
wS
dwS
d¯| {z }
marginal cost effect
(–)
¡nF
¯| {z }
competition-reducing effect
(–)
io
: (26)
As shown on the right-hand side (RHS) of (26), an increase in patent breadth in the South affects the
welfare of both countries through the following three channels. The first channel is the welfare effect
that occurs through enhancing innovation, which is indicated by the first term on the RHS of (26). As
shown in Proposition 2, increasing patent breadth promotes innovation and raises welfare. We refer to
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this effect as the innovation-enhancing effect. This effect has a positive influence on the welfare of both
countries. The second channel is the welfare effect that occurs through the change in nominal spending,
which is indicated by the second term on the RHS of (26). As shown by (20), (21), and Proposition
1, increasing patent breadth raises nominal spending in the South, but reduces nominal spending in the
North. Thus, it affects the welfare of both countries. We refer to this effect as the nominal spending
effect. The third channel is the welfare effect that occurs through changing the prices of goods, which is
indicated by the three terms in square brackets on the RHS of (26).
The sign of the sum of the three terms in the square brackets is indeterminate because increasing
patent breadth has both positive and negative effects on the prices of goods in the following ways. First,
extending patent breadth increases the proportion of goods that multinationals produce, as shown in
Proposition 2. Because patent breadth is smaller in the South than in the North, the price of the goods
produced by multinationals (¯wS) is lower than the price of the goods produced by Northern leaders
(¸wS). This means that an increase in patent breadth improves the welfare of both countries by increas-
ing the proportion of FDI firms, nF . We refer to this positive welfare effect as the FDI-promoting effect,
which is indicated by the first term in the square brackets. Second, from (16), increasing patent breadth
raises the wage rate in the South. This causes a rise in the marginal costs of followers, which allows
Northern leaders and multinationals to charge higher prices, and this reduces the welfare of both coun-
tries. We refer to this negative effect as the marginal cost effect, which is indicated by the second term
in the square brackets. Third, increasing patent breadth in the South enables multinationals to raise the
price of their goods directly, which reduces welfare. This is because increasing patent breadth permits
Southern firms other than multinationals to produce only goods of lower quality. This means that multi-
nationals can outcompete other firms even if multinationals charge a higher price for their goods. For
this reason, increasing patent breadth reduces the welfare of both countries. We refer to this negative
effect, which is shown by the last term in the square brackets, as the competition-reducing effect.
If the positive welfare effects outweigh the negative welfare effects, then strengthening patent pro-
tection in the South raises welfare. As shown in the subsequent subsections, whether this is the case
depends on the values of the parameters.
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4.1 The Effect on the South’s Welfare
First, we explore the effect of strengthening patent protection on the South’s welfare. We determine
the parameter values that cause the strictest patent protection to maximize the welfare of Southern con-
sumers. In the rest of this subsection, as a benchmark, we focus on the case in which consumers in the
South have no assets at the initial point in time; that is, ³ = 1. In Subsection 4.3, we analyze the general
case in which ³ 6= 1.
We can summarize the results of our analysis of the South’s welfare in the case of ³ = 1 as follows.24
Proposition 3. Suppose that consumers in the South have no assets at the initial point in time. Then, the
strictest patent protection in the South (¯S = ¸) maximizes the welfare of consumers in the South if and
only if the parameters satisfy (log ¸)(LN + ¸LS + ½aN )=(¸2½aN ) ¸ LS= (LN + LS + ½aN ).
Proof. If ³ = 1, we obtain the following equality from (21) and (26) in the range of ¯ 2 (¯min; ¸]:
dUS(¯)=d¯ = [f(¯) + (log ¸¡ log ¯) (dnF =d¯)] =½, where f(¯) ´ [(log ¸) =½] (dI=d¯) ¡ (nF =¯).
It is straightforward to show that f 0(¯) < 0 from (17) and (19), and therefore f(¯) ¸ 0 for all ¯ 2
(¯min; ¸] if f(¸) ¸ 0. Because (log ¸¡ log ¯) (dnF =d¯) ¸ 0, this implies that dUS(¯)=d¯ ¸ 0 for
all ¯ 2 (¯min; ¸] if f(¸) ¸ 0. Meanwhile, if f(¸) < 0, then dUS(¸)=d¯ < 0. This is because
(log ¸¡ log ¯) (dnF =d¯) = 0 when ¯ = ¸. As a result, the strictest patent protection (¯S = ¸)
maximizes the welfare of consumers in the South if and only if f(¸) ¸ 0. By rewriting f(¸) ¸ 0, we
obtain (log ¸)(LN + ¸LS + ½aN )=(¸2½aN ) ¸ LS= (LN + LS + ½aN ).
If ³ = 1, then dUS(¯)=d¯ is simplified to the sum of the innovation-enhancing effect, the FDI-
promoting effect, and the competition-reducing effect because ES = wS from (21). The innovation-
enhancing effect necessarily offsets the competition-reducing effect for all ¯ 2 (¯min; ¸] if and only if
the parameters satisfy the condition in Proposition 3. The FDI-promoting effect is necessarily nonnega-
tive and is zero when ¯ = ¸. Therefore, the strictest patent protection maximizes welfare in the South if
and only if the condition in Proposition 3 holds.
24For Propositions 3–5, we assume that the degree of patent protection in the South is no weaker than the level of protection
below which Northern R&D activities cease; that is, ¯ 2 (¯min; ¸]. For some set of parameter values, a low value of ¯ that
prevents innovation could maximize welfare. However, if the cost of innovation is sufficiently low, there is no such set of
parameter values. For instance, by assuming aN < (¸ ¡ 1)(LN + LS)2= f[(¸+ 1)(LN + LS) + ¸LS ] ½g, we can show
that any low value of ¯ that prevents innovation will maximize neither the welfare of Southern consumers nor that of Northern
consumers. The proof is given in Appendix D.
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Clearly, the larger is Northern labor, LN , the more likely is the condition in Proposition 3 to hold.
Therefore, Proposition 3 implies that the strictest patent protection improves the welfare of consumers
in the South if labor is more abundant in the North. Why might strengthening patent protection raise
the welfare of Southern consumers in such a case? An increased abundance of labor in the North
intensifies the promotion of the innovation effect of strengthening patent protection, dI=d¯, which is
represented by the left-hand side (LHS) of the condition in Proposition 3. Moreover, an increased abun-
dance of Northern labor decreases the proportion of multinationals, nF , and, consequently, weakens
the competition-reducing effect of strengthening patent protection, ¡nF =¯, which is represented by the
RHS of the condition in Proposition 3. Thus, the more abundant is labor in the North, the more intensive
is the positive welfare effect of strengthening patent protection.
In addition, the condition in Proposition 3 necessarily holds irrespective of the amount of labor in
the North, as long as LS=aN is sufficiently large that LS=aN ¸ ¸½= [(log ¸)(2¸¡ 1)].25 Therefore,
Proposition 3 shows that the strictest patent protection improves the welfare of consumers in the South
if labor is more abundant in the South and if the productivity of R&D is higher in the North. The reason
is as follows. The more abundant is labor in the South and the higher is the productivity of R&D in the
North, the larger is the innovation-enhancing effect of strengthening patent protection, dI=d¯. However,
higher R&D productivity and Southern labor abundance increase the proportion of multinationals, nF ,
the consequence of which is an intensification of the competition-reducing effect of strengthening patent
protection. Thus, increased labor abundance in the South and increased productivity of R&D in the
North have two opposing effects on welfare. However, if LS=aN is sufficiently large to satisfy LS=aN ¸
¸½= [(log ¸)(2¸¡ 1)], the former positive effect outweighs the latter negative effect.
Proposition 3 is important in the following two respects. First, it seems widely supposed that
strengthening patent protection, particularly by equating levels of protection in the North and South,
lowers welfare in the South. However, our result contradicts this intuitive supposition, and shows that,
far from being harmful, strengthening patent protection in the South, even to the extent that its level of
protection matches that of the North, may benefit the South.26 In other words, this paper provides a ratio-
25The proof is given in Appendix E.
26 A possible explanation for the intuitive supposition is that the benefits conferred by the innovation-enhancing effect are
underestimated because this effect is difficult to discern in practice. In addition, as mentioned in the conclusion, incorporating
enforcement costs to implement patent protection, which we ignore in this paper, into the analysis may reduce the probability
that the strictest protection of patent maximizes the welfare in the South.
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nale for strengthening patent protection, which is a policy implemented in many developing countries.27
Second, our result contrasts with that of Helpman (1993), the seminal paper that examines the effect
of strengthening IPR protection on welfare. Helpman examined the welfare effect of strengthening IPR
protection both in an endogenous innovation model, in which the only mode of technology transfer
is illegal imitation, and in an exogenous innovation model, in which FDI is the mode of technology
transfer. Helpman concluded from both models that stronger IPR protection in the South necessarily
damages welfare in the South. We obtain important implications from our results that contrast with the
results of Helpman’s two models. First, comparing our model with Helpman’s model in which imitation
is the only mode of technology transfer suggests that the effect of strengthening IPR protection on the
South’s welfare depends on the main mode of technology transfer: when the main mode of technology
transfer is FDI, strengthening IPR protection is likely to raise the South’s welfare. Second, comparing our
model with Helpman’s model incorporating FDI suggests that taking the innovation-enhancing effect into
account may reverse the sign of the total welfare effect of strengthening IPR protection: if the positive
effect on innovation of strengthening IPR protection is taken into account, increasing patent protection
might raise the South’s welfare.
4.2 The Effect on the North’s Welfare
Next, we examine how strengthening patent protection in the South affects the North’s welfare. To
do this, we first show that the effect on the North’s welfare of increasing patent breadth is indepen-
dent of the initial distribution of assets, ³. From (15), (16), and (20), EN=wS becomes EN=wS =
[1 + (³½aN=LN )] (¸=¯). Then, the effect of increasing patent breadth on log(EN=wS) is given by:
1
EN
dEN
d¯
¡ 1
wS
dwS
d¯
= ¡ 1
¯
< 0: (27)
This shows that the effect of increasing patent breadth on log(EN=wS), that is, the sum of the nominal
spending effect and the marginal cost effect, is independent of the initial distribution of assets, ³. Because
the innovation rate, I , and the measure of multinationals, nF , are independent of ³, the magnitudes of
the innovation-enhancing effect, the FDI-promoting effect, and the competition-reducing effect do not
depend on ³. Thus, the effect on the North’s welfare, dUN (¯)=d¯, is independent of ³.
27 Park’s (2008) panel data on the index of patent protection show that many developing countries strengthened patent
protection between 1990 and 2005.
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As shown in the following proposition, dUN (¯)=d¯ is positive for all ¯ 2 (¯min; ¸] if the parameters
satisfy an inequality.
Proposition 4. The strictest patent protection in the South (¯S = ¸) maximizes the welfare of consumers
in the North if the parameters satisfy LN ¸ [¸=(log ¸)¡ 1] ½aN .
Proof. By substituting (27) into (26), we can rewrite dUN (¯)=d¯ as follows:
dUN (¯)
d¯
=
1
½
·
log ¸
½
dI
d¯
¡ nF
¯
¡ 1
¯
+ (log ¸¡ log ¯) dnF
d¯
¸
: (28)
If [(log ¸) =½] (dI=d¯)¡(nF =¯)¡(1=¯) > 0, then dUN (¯)=d¯ > 0 because (log ¸¡ log ¯) (dnF =d¯) ¸
0. From (17) and (19), we find that the following relationship holds:
log ¸
½
dI
d¯
¡ nF
¯
¡ 1
¯
=
log ¸
½
·µ
LN
aN
+ ½
¶
1
¯2
+
LS
¸aN
¸
¡ (¯=¸)LS
LN + ½aN + (¯=¸)LS
¡ 1
¯
>
log ¸
½
·µ
LN
aN
+ ½
¶
1
¯2
+
LS
¸aN
¸
¡ (¯=¸)LS
LN + ½aN
¡ 1
¯
=
1
¯
·
LN + ½aN +
¯2
¸
LS
¸ ·
log ¸
½aN¯
¡ 1
LN + ½aN
¸
: (29)
If LN ¸ [¸=(log ¸)¡ 1] ½aN , then the parameters satisfy (log ¸) = (½aN¯) ¸ 1= (LN + ½aN ) for all
¯ 2 [1; ¸]. Therefore, from (28) and (29), we can conclude that dUN (¯)=d¯ > 0 for any value of
¯ 2 (¯min; ¸] if the parameters satisfy LN ¸ [¸=(log ¸)¡ 1] ½aN .
The strictest patent protection maximizes Northern welfare when the quantity of Northern labor is
relatively large for the same reasons as given in the interpretation of Proposition 3. That is, an increased
abundance of Northern labor enhances the innovation-enhancing effect of strengthening patent protection
and, thus, the positive welfare effects outweigh the negative welfare effects.
The condition in Proposition 4 is stricter than the condition in Proposition 3.28 Hence, we can show
that when ³ = 1, strengthening patent protection makes both the South and the North better off as long
as the parameters satisfy the condition in Proposition 4. In other words, as long as labor resources in
the North are sufficiently abundant or as long as the productivity of R&D is sufficiently high to satisfy
28The LHS of the inequality in Proposition 3 is an increasing function of LN and the RHS is a decreasing function of
LN . Substituting LN = [¸=(log ¸) ¡ 1]½aN into the inequality in Proposition 3 reveals that the inequality holds if LN =
[¸=(log ¸)¡ 1]½aN . Thus, the inequality in Proposition 3 holds whenever LN ¸ [¸=(log ¸)¡ 1]½aN .
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the condition, then raising patent protection in the South to the level enjoyed in the North is a Pareto-
improving policy.29
With respect to the effect on the welfare of consumers in the North, the results of the present pa-
per are consistent with those of Helpman’s FDI model. In his exogenous innovation model, Helpman
concluded that tightening IPR protection when the main mode of technology transfer is FDI benefits the
North if the imitation rate in the South is sufficiently low. Our endogenous innovation model implies that
maximum patent protection in developing countries is globally optimal for the consumers in the North
if labor resources in the North are sufficiently abundant or if the productivity of R&D is sufficiently
high. This result implies that Helpman’s conclusion about Northern welfare is robust to incorporating
the innovation-enhancing effect of strengthening IPR protection. In that sense, our Proposition 4 com-
plements Helpman’s conclusion about Northern welfare.
4.3 Generalizing the Initial Distribution of Assets
In order to generalize the result described in Proposition 3, we show that the strictest patent protection
can maximize the welfare of consumers in the South even when ³ 6= 1. When ³ 6= 1, the nominal
spending effect and the marginal cost effect do not cancel each other out. Thus, one must consider these
welfare effects of strengthening patent protection. From (16) and (21), ES=wS becomes ES=wS =
1 + [(1¡ ³)¸½aN= (¯LS)] : Hence, the effect of strengthening patent protection on log(ES=wS) is:
1
ES
dES
d¯
¡ 1
wS
dwS
d¯
= ¡ 1¡ ³
¯LS=(¸½aN ) + 1¡ ³
1
¯
< 0: (30)
This means that the higher is the initial level of assets held by Southern consumers (the larger is (1¡ ³)),
the greater is the negative effect of strengthening patent protection on log(ES=wS). Therefore, the total
effect of strengthening patent protection on the welfare of Southern consumers is more likely to be
negative the higher is the initial level of assets held by Southern consumers. However, we can show
29 The RHS of the inequality in Proposition 4 is a U-shaped function of ¸, and the restriction for the other parameters becomes
stringent when ¸ takes extremely large or small values. However, unless ¸ is an extreme value, the ranges of values for LN , aN ,
and ½ that satisfy the inequality are sufficiently broad. We assess the stringency of the inequality by using a numerical example.
Following the numerical analysis of S¸ener (2008), we use the range [1:05; 1:4] for ¸ so that the value of ¸¡ 1 representing the
markup in this model can be consistent with empirical data. Assuming that ½ is 0.05, if LN=aN > 1:02604, the inequality in
Proposition 4 holds. Further, LN=aN must satisfy the conditions that (¸¡1)LS < LN +½aN and (¸¡1)(LN +LS) > ½aN ,
which are assumed in Section 3. However, as long as LS=aN is less than 21:5207, values of LN=aN that exceed 1:02604
satisfy the two conditions. Thus, the parametric restrictions are not particularly stringent.
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that the strictest patent protection maximizes the welfare of Southern consumers for any ³ 2 [0; 1] if
the parameters satisfy the condition given in Proposition 4. Combining this result with that stated in
Proposition 4 enables us to state the following proposition.
Proposition 5. The strictest patent protection in the South (¯S = ¸) maximizes the welfare of consumers
in both the South and the North for any initial asset distribution between the North and the South if the
parameters satisfy LN ¸ [¸=(log ¸)¡ 1] ½aN .
Proof. The proof relating to the welfare of Northern consumers is given in Proposition 4. Therefore, it
is sufficient for this proof to show that dUS(¯)=d¯ > 0 for any values of ¯ 2 (¯min; ¸] and ³ 2 [0; 1]
if the parameters satisfy LN ¸ [¸=(log ¸)¡ 1] ½aN . We can rewrite dUS(¯)=d¯ for any ³ 2 [0; 1] as
follows:
dUS(¯)
d¯
=
1
½
·
log ¸
½
dI
d¯
¡ nF
¯
+
µ
1
ES
dES
d¯
¡ 1
wS
dwS
d¯
¶
+ (log ¸¡ log ¯) dnF
d¯
¸
>
1
½
·
log ¸
½
dI
d¯
¡ nF
¯
¡ 1
¯
+ (log ¸¡ log ¯) dnF
d¯
¸
; (31)
where the inequality holds because (1=ES) (dES=d¯) ¡ (1=wS) (dwS=d¯) > ¡1=¯ from (30). Note
that the RHS of (31) is equal to dUN (¯)=d¯. Therefore, using the same proof as in Proposition 4, we
can show that dUS(¯)=d¯ > dUN (¯)=d¯ > 0 for any values of ¯ 2 (¯min; ¸] and ³ 2 [0; 1] if the
parameters satisfy LN ¸ [¸=(log ¸)¡ 1] ½aN .
Proposition 5 shows that as long as labor resources in the North are sufficiently abundant or as
long as the productivity of innovation is sufficiently high to satisfy the condition, then raising patent
protection in the South to the level enjoyed in the North is a Pareto-improving policy irrespective of
the distribution of assets between the North and the South. To establish Proposition 3, we assumed
that Southern consumers initially held no assets. As shown by (21), holding no initial assets implies
that no assets are ever held, which appears to imply that the proposition is dependent on restricting the
distribution of assets. However, if the inequality in Proposition 5 holds, the strictest patent protection in
the South is optimal, regardless of the distribution of assets between countries. That is, even if Southern
consumers hold assets, the strictest patent protection in the South can maximize the welfare of Southern
consumers.
The result given in Proposition 5 differs from that obtained by Grossman and Lai (2004). They
showed that maximum patent protection tends to be suboptimal for the South. The difference between
– 25 –
their results and ours is largely attributable to the difference in the size of the dynamic benefit of strength-
ening patent protection in the South. By using a quality-ladder type model, we assume that innovation
occurs through the improvement of existing goods. In our model, the invention of a latest-generation
good generates permanent social benefit by providing fundamental knowledge that is freely available to
the R&D of that industry even after obsolescence. Having assumed that the invention of a good has no
influence on other R&D, Grossman and Lai (2004) ignore this “shoulders-of-giants” effect in the R&D
process. Taking this effect into account implies that strengthening patent protection in the South can gen-
erate dynamic benefits supplementary to those identified by Grossman and Lai because patent protection
increases the fundamental knowledge available for future R&D by promoting innovation. Thus, in our
model, stronger patent protection in the South can improve the welfare of the South if R&D resources
in the North are sufficient and if R&D is sufficiently productive. Moreover, even patent harmonization,
which requires maximum patent protection in the South, can improve welfare of the South.30
5 Discussion
5.1 R&D Subsidies and Patent Protection in the South
In Proposition 5, we concluded that, provided a certain parameter condition is satisfied, the strictest
patent protection in the South can maximize welfare in both the North and the South. In this subsection,
we briefly consider the possibility that the strictest patent protection is suboptimal for the South. Suppose
that the Southern government implements patent protection that is weaker than the maximum, and does
not cooperate with the Northern government. Can the Northern government implement a policy that
induces the Southern government to maximize its patent protection in this case?
One policy option is for the North to raise R&D productivity, perhaps by improving higher educa-
tion. Higher education is important for training researchers who develop new products. Improvements
in higher education that successfully raise researchers’ abilities to do R&D will increase the produc-
30 If one introduces into our model imitation by Southern firms of multinationals’ technology, our welfare results might
change for the following three reasons. First, in such a model, strengthening patent protection in the South would affect welfare
through channels other than (26) because it would be bound to affect the progress of imitation and the measure of imitated
products. Second, imitation by Southern firms would change the magnitudes of the five welfare effects derived in our model.
Third, introducing imitation into our model would generate transitional dynamics, as explained in footnote 20. Thus, if imitation
activities are sufficiently pervasive and convergence to the steady state is sufficiently slow, our welfare results might change.
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tivity of R&D in the economy. According to our model, an improvement in the productivity of R&D,
which is represented by a decrease in aN , reinforces the innovation-enhancing effect. Hence, such an
improvement can reduce the stringency of the parameter constraint that must be satisfied if the strongest
patent protection is to maximize the welfare of Southern consumers, as shown in Proposition 5. There-
fore, a policy that increases R&D productivity, including an improvement in higher education, gives the
Southern government an incentive to maximize its patent protection.
Another policy option to induce the South to enact maximum patent protection is to subsidize R&D.
We can analyze the effect of an R&D subsidy by somewhat modifying our model.31 Suppose that the
Northern government subsidizes entrepreneurs by 100 £ sR percent of R&D costs, where sR 2 [0; 1).
We assume that the subsidies are financed by a lump-sum tax levied on Northern consumers, and assume
that the Northern government runs a balanced budget at each point in time. Under these assumptions,
strengthening patent protection in the South still affects the welfare of the South through the five chan-
nels shown in (26). Among those channels, the innovation-enhancing effect tends to be represented by
an inverted U-shaped function of sR: the effect strengthens as sR increases up to a certain point, after
which it weakens. In addition, the R&D subsidy exacerbates the negative competition-reducing effect.
However, subsidizing R&D mitigates the negative effect of the combined nominal spending and marginal
cost effects, and also increases the positive FDI-promoting effect. Thus, if the positive effects of intro-
ducing an R&D subsidy on dUS(¯)=d¯ outweigh the negative effects, then introducing an R&D subsidy
may make the strongest patent protection optimal for the South.
5.2 Reexamination in a Nonscale Effect Model
In this subsection, we introduce population growth into the model and examine how our basic results
would change. In practice, population grows in many countries. However, so far, we have assumed that
the quantity of labor supplied is constant over time. In addition, the model developed in the preceding
sections exhibits a scale effect; that is, an increase in the size of the labor force raises the innovation rate
and the growth rate of utility. Therefore, in line with the settings used by Segerstrom (1998), who devel-
oped a closed economy quality-ladder model without a scale effect, we incorporate positive population
growth into our model and examine the robustness of our main results.
We first describe the settings of the nonscale effect model and derive the effects of strengthening
31In Appendix F, we analyze the effect of an R&D subsidy in our model.
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patent protection on innovation and FDI. We retain the notation used and the assumptions made in the
original model if possible. Following earlier studies, which use two-country nonscale effect models, such
as Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010), we assume that the labor population grows at the same constant
rate, n, in both the North and South, and that 0 < n < ½. We let ¹LN and ¹LS denote the initial levels
of population in the North and South, respectively. Letting Lt denote the total world population at time
t, we can represent Lt as Lt = (¹LN + ¹LS)ent. Further, we define ~Li as the ratio of the population
of country i 2 fN;Sg to the world population; that is, ~Li = ¹Li=(¹LN + ¹LS). Suppose that the initial
measure of members of each household in country i 2 fN;Sg is unity; in other words, the measure of
households in country i 2 fN;Sg equals ¹Li. We assume that the number of members of each household
grows at the constant rate n in both countries. Then, the lifetime utility of each representative household
in country i 2 fN;Sg is given by Ui =
R1
0 e
¡(½¡n)t log ui;tdt: The modified budget constraint isR1
0 e
¡ R t0 (rs¡n)dsEi;tdt = Ai;0 + R10 e¡ R t0 (rs¡n)dswi;tdt. Thus, the demand for each product and the
Euler equation for each household are the same as those in Section 2.1. We let ct denote per capita global
spending; that is, ct ´ Et=Lt. In Section 5.2, unlike in the original model, we use the per capita global
spending as the numeraire and normalize ct = Et=Lt = EN;t ~LN+ES;t ~LS = 1 for all t so that rt always
equals ½. Hence, the per capita spending of households in country i, Ei;t, is constant for all t.
In order to remove the scale effect from the original model, we need to change an assumption on
the cost of R&D. Following Segerstrom (1998), we assume that R&D costs increase with the aggregate
volume of R&D over time. Concretely, we replace the cost of R&D, aN , with aNXt(!), where Xt(!)
represents the difficulty of doing R&D in industry !, which is assumed to evolve as follows:
_Xt(!)
Xt(!)
= ¹It(!); (32)
where ¹ is a parameter that affects the growth rate of the difficulty of doing R&D: an increase in ¹ implies
an increase in the growth rate of the difficulty of doing R&D. Under this assumption, the innovation rate
and the growth rate of the utility level do not depend on the population level in the long run as shown
below.32
Under the assumption of increasing difficulty of R&D, the free entry condition for R&D, (4), changes
to vN;t(!) = wN;taNXt(!), where vN;t(!) means that the stock values are not necessarily symmetrical
among industries ex ante. However, assuming that the R&D difficulty index, Xt(!), is symmetrical
across industries at the initial point in time makes the innovation rate It(!) symmetrical across industries
32The earlier nonscale effect models including Segerstrom (1998) exhibit this property.
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and, thus, vN;t(!) is also symmetrical because of the no-arbitrage condition. As a result, no variable
depends on ! in equilibrium. Therefore, we henceforth omit ! from the equilibrium conditions, including
the free entry condition for R&D:
vN;t = wN;taNXt: (33)
The other equilibrium conditions are as follows. Because of the change in the normalization, the
profits of Northern firms and multinationals, respectively, change to ¼N;t = [1¡ wN;t=(¸wS;t)]Lt and
¼F;t = (1¡ 1=¯)Lt. The no-arbitrage conditions for the stocks of Northern leaders and multinationals,
(6) and (7), respectively, remain unchanged. Thus, the equilibrium condition for FDI, (10), holds, and we
thereby obtain the equilibrium wage rate in the South as (11). The labor market equilibrium conditions
in the South and the North are nF;tLt=(¯wS;t) = LS;t and nN;tLt=(¸wS;t) + aNXtIt = LN;t:
Although incorporating increasing R&D costs purges the model of the scale effect, it also introduces
transitional dynamics into the model. This complicates analysis of the effects of policy changes because
one must consider their effects on the transition. However, by linearizing the market equilibrium path
around the balanced growth path (BGP), we can show that strengthening patent protection does raise
innovation and the growth rate on the transitional path, while it does not affect them in the long run.
Proposition 6. We consider the nonscale effect model. Suppose that the economy is initially on the BGP.
Strengthening patent protection marginally in the South promotes innovation in the short run, although
the positive effect approaches zero in the long run. Moreover, strengthening patent protection marginally
in the South promotes FDI in both the short run and the long run.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Using the results of the positive analysis, we now conduct welfare analysis in the nonscale effect
model. To examine analytically how strengthening patent protection affects welfare, we adopt an ap-
proach similar to the one used by Helpman (1993). We assume that, when patent breadth is changed, the
economy is on the BGP. We then evaluate the effect on welfare of Northern and Southern households of
a marginal increase in ¯. The instantaneous utility of any household in each country remains unchanged
as in the original model: log ui;t = (log ¸)
R t
0 I¿d¿ + logEi ¡ logwS;t + (log ¸¡ log ¯)nF;t ¡ log ¸:
Because instantaneous utility comprises five parts, we can decompose the total welfare effect into the
– 29 –
following five parts as we did in the original model:
dUi(¯)
d¯
=
Z 1
0
e¡(½¡n)t
n
(log ¸)
d
d¯
µZ t
0
I¿d¿
¶
| {z }
innovation-enhancing effect
(+)
+
d logEi
d¯| {z }
nominal spending effect
(+) or (–)
+
h
(log ¸¡ log ¯) dnF;t
d¯| {z }
FDI-promoting effect
(+)
¡d logwS;t
d¯| {z }
marginal cost effect
(+) or (–)
¡nF;t
¯| {z }
competition-reducing effect
(–)
io
dt: (34)
Each of these effects corresponds to a welfare effect in the original model which exhibits scale effects,
(26). As proved in Appendix B, the signs of some of the welfare effects are determinate as shown in
(34).
As was the case for the original model, by showing that the innovation-enhancing effect outweighs
the competition-reducing effect and the combined negative effect of the nominal spending and marginal
cost effects, we can show that strengthening patent protection improves the welfare of Northern and
Southern households. The following proposition summarizes the results of our welfare analysis of the
nonscale effect model.33
Proposition 7. We consider the nonscale effect model. Suppose that the economy is initially on the
BGP. Strengthening patent protection marginally in the South raises the welfare of households in both
North and South for all ¯ 2 (1; ¸], if the parameters satisfy either (i): n½ log ¸¹ > ­; or (ii): ~LS <h
¸
¸¡1
n
½
log ¸
¹ ¡ ­
i h
­¡ n½ log ¸¹
i¡1
­¡1; where ­ ´ ¸+¹[(½=n)¡1]1+¹[(½=n)¡1] .
Proposition 7 implies that when the South’s population share is lower (and the North’s is higher),
strengthening patent protection in the South tends to improve the welfare of the Northern and Southern
households. The reason is similar to that in the original model; the higher is the North’s share of the
labor population, the more likely is the positive innovation-enhancing welfare effect to outweigh the
negative competition-reducing welfare effect. This implies that the welfare effects of patent protection
in the South are robust to the incorporation of a nonscale effect.34
33See Appendix H for the proof.
34 As S¸ener (2008) pointed out, the policy results may depend on how the scale effect is purged from the model. According to
S¸ener (2008), there are three main approaches to removing scale effects: incorporating diminishing technological opportunities,
as undertaken by Segerstrom (1998); incorporating rent protection activities, as proposed by Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007);
and incorporating variety expansion, as undertaken by, for example, Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998). We adopt the first of
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6 Conclusion
We developed a North–South quality-ladder model, in which foreign direct investment (FDI) is the main
channel of technology transfer. We then conducted not only a positive analysis but also a welfare analysis.
Despite the fact that welfare analysis is crucial for assessing policies, few previous theoretical studies
on intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in developing countries have conducted such an analysis.
However, by focusing our analysis on patent breadth, we examined analytically how strengthening patent
protection in the South affects welfare in the South. We showed that strengthening patent protection can
raise welfare not only in the North but also in the South.
This result contrasts with that of Helpman (1993), whose pioneering study examined the effect of
stronger IPR protection on welfare. Helpman concluded that stronger IPR protection in the South nec-
essarily damages welfare in the South, regardless of whether the mode of technology transfer is illegal
imitation or FDI. However, our results differed markedly from Helpman’s in this respect. Thus, our result
provides a theoretical basis for strengthening patent protection in the South.
To simplify the analysis and obtain clearer results, we abstracted from two factors whose incorpo-
ration would make the model more realistic. The first is the costs of enforcing patent protection. In
practice, resources are required to enforce patent protection. For instance, the government must allocate
labor to institutions applying laws dealing with patent infringements. Hence, increasing patent breadth
requires more labor resources. Incorporating the costs associated with patent protection might result in
our finding that strengthening patent protection improves Southern welfare being subject to more strin-
gent restrictions. The second factor is trade barriers between North and South. Trade barriers, in the form
of tariffs, for example, are expected to affect both the benefits and costs of stronger patent protection in
the South. For example, the existence of tariffs might induce tariff-jumping FDI from the North and
might intensify the positive FDI-promoting welfare effect of strengthening patent protection. Moreover,
increasing the number of multinationals by strengthening patent protection might reduce the South’s tar-
iff revenue, thereby reducing the welfare of Southern consumers. Incorporating tariffs into the model
might also have other effects that are not easily predictable or obvious.35 Although these extensions are
these approaches. Adopting either of the other two approaches is beyond the scope of the present paper. However, examining
the effect of these other approaches on the results is worthwhile.
35Related studies examined the effect of trade liberalization using a North–South quality-ladder model. By extending the
symmetric North–North model of Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) to a North–South model, Grieben (2005) examined how
Northern and Southern tariffs affect wage inequality in the North. Grieben and S¸ener (2009) examined how tariff reductions
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beyond the scope of the present paper, they are worth examining.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 6
In this appendix, we prove Proposition 6.
To describe the equilibrium path, we define the following two variables: zt ´ Lt=(aNXt) and
yt ´ Lt=vt, each of which is constant on the BGP. Note that zt is a state variable, whereas yt is a jump
variable. From (11) and (33), the wage rates in the North and the South are represented by using zt and
yt:
wN;t =
zt
yt
and wS;t =
¯
¸
zt
yt
: (35)
In addition, from (35) and the labor market equilibrium conditions, the innovation rate and the measure
of multinationals in the market equilibrium are expressed by using zt and yt as follows:
It = ~L(¯)zt ¡ 1
¯
yt; (36)
nF;t =
¯2
¸
~LS
zt
yt
; (37)
where ~L(¯) ´ ~LN + (¯=¸)~LS . Given (7), (32), (36), and (37), the market equilibrium path in this
nonscale effect model can be characterized by the dynamic system for zt and yt as follows:
_zt
zt
= n¡ ¹
·
~L(¯)zt ¡ 1
¯
yt
¸
; (38)
_yt
yt
= ¡~L(¯)zt + yt ¡ (½¡ n): (39)
All of the other endogenous variables are determined by the values of zt and yt. From (38) and (39), zt
and yt are constant on the BGP and satisfy:
z =
1
(¯ ¡ 1)~L(¯)
µ
¯n
¹
+ ½¡ n
¶
and y = ¯
¯ ¡ 1
µ
n
¹
+ ½¡ n
¶
; (40)
where z and y are the values on the BGP. As in the original model, terms without the subscript “t”
represent values on the BGP.
By conducting comparative statics, we can derive the long-run effects of an increase in ¯ on It and
nF;t. Suppose that the economy is on the BGP until patent protection is changed at time 0. From (36) and
affect Northern innovation and Southern imitation in a North–South model in which Northern monopolists engage in rent-
protection activities, which were originally proposed by Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007).
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(40), on the BGP, we obtain I = n=¹, which is independent of ¯. Thus, strengthening patent protection
does not affect the long-run innovation rate. Meanwhile, differentiating (40) with respect to ¯ yields:
z¯ ´ dz
d¯
= ¡ y
¯(¯ ¡ 1)~L(¯) ¡
~LS
¸~L(¯)
z < 0; (41)
y¯ ´ dy
d¯
= ¡ y
¯(¯ ¡ 1) < 0: (42)
By using (37), (41), and (42), we obtain the effect of strengthening patent protection on nF as follows:
dnF =d¯ = nF
n
~LN=[¯ ~L(¯)] + n=[¹(¯ ¡ 1)~L(¯)z]
o
> 0, where we use the relationship that y =
¯ ~L(¯)z ¡ (¯n=¹) on the BGP from (38). Hence, strengthening patent protection in the South increases
the measure of multinationals in the long run.
Unlike the original model, the nonscale effect model has transitional dynamics because zt is a state
variable. Therefore, we must take the effects on the transition into consideration to evaluate the overall
effects of a policy. To do so, we derive the linearized system of zt and yt in the neighborhood of the BGP
and compute the transition paths of It and nF;t. The linearized system of (38) and (39) is given by:0@ _zt
_yt
1A =
0@¡¹~L(¯)z ¹¯ z
¡~L(¯)y y
1A0@ zt ¡ z
yt ¡ y
1A : (43)
Let J denote the Jacobian matrix of the dynamic system on the RHS of (43). The determinant of J is
negative as follows: det J = ¡(¯ ¡ 1)¹~L(¯)zy=¯ < 0. Therefore, one characteristic root is negative
and the other is positive and, thus, the BGP is a saddle point. Because yt is a jump variable, whereas
zt is a state variable, the market equilibrium path is uniquely determined in this nonscale effect model.
Moreover, we can show that the negative root of the characteristic equation is smaller than ¡n. We
let º denote the negative characteristic root and we let h = [1;¤]T denote the characteristic vector
corresponding to º. Solving Jh = ºh for ¤ yields ¤ = ¯[º=(¹z) + ~L(¯)]. Using the characteristic
root and vector, we obtain the market equilibrium path, including the transition, as follows: zt = z +
(z0 ¡ z) eºt and yt = y + (z0 ¡ z) ¤eºt. By differentiating these expressions with respect to ¯, we can
describe the responses of zt and yt to a marginal increase in ¯ as the following functions of time t:
dzt
d¯
= z¯
¡
1¡ eºt¢ ; (44)
dyt
d¯
= y¯ ¡ z¯¤eºt; (45)
where z0 = z is used because we assume that the economy is on the BGP at the initial point in time and
that zt is not jumpable.
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Finally, we derive the complete paths of the effects of a change in ¯ on It and nF;t from the paths of
zt and yt. By using (36), (44), and (45), we obtain: dIt=d¯ = (~LSz=¸) + ~L(¯)z¯ + (y=¯2)¡ (y¯=¯) +h
¡~L(¯) + (¤=¯)
i
z¯e
ºt: By substituting (41), (42), and ¤ = ¯[º=(¹z) + ~L(¯)] into this equation, we
obtain:
dIt
d¯
= (¡º)¡z¯
¹z
eºt > 0: (46)
This shows that a rise in ¯ enhances innovation in the short run, although the positive effect vanishes in
the long run because º < 0. Likewise, by using (37), (38), (41), (42), (44), and (45), we obtain:
dnF;t
d¯
= nF
"
~LN
¯ ~L(¯)
+
n
¹(¯ ¡ 1)~L(¯)z + (y ¡ z¤)
¡z¯
zy
eºt
#
: (47)
The first two terms on the RHS of (47) represent the long-run effect on nF;t, which is positive. Moreover,
from ¤ = ¯[º=(¹z)+ ~L(¯)] and (40), we obtain y¡z¤ = ¡¯(º+n)=¹. Because º < ¡n as mentioned
above, y ¡ z¤ > 0 holds. This implies that the last term on the RHS of (47) is positive, and thus, a rise
in ¯ promotes FDI in the short run as well as in the long run.
Appendix B: The Welfare Effects in the Nonscale Effect Model
In this appendix, we evaluate each of the constituent welfare effects in (34).
First, we can derive the magnitude of the welfare effect through enhancing innovation from (46) as
follows:
R1
0 e
¡(½¡n)t(log ¸)
h
d
³R t
0 I¿d¿
´
=d¯
i
dt = f[1=(½¡n)]¡1=(½¡n¡º)g(log ¸)(¡z¯)=(¹z) >
0. An increase in ¯ enhances innovation in the short run. Thus, the innovation-enhancing effect is posi-
tive in the nonscale effect model, as in the original model.
Second, we evaluate the welfare effect through nominal spending. Because per capita spending
is constant over time in each country, the intertemporal budget constraint can be reduced to Ei =
(½¡n) (Ai;0 +Wi), where Wi =
R1
0 e
¡(½¡n)twi;tdt for i 2 fN;Sg. Global total initial asset holdings,
A0, equal the total volume of stocks at the initial point in time: A0 = v0 £ (nN;0 + nF;0) = L0=y0. By
using ³ ´ AN;0 ¹LN=A0, which denotes the share of assets held by Northern households at the initial time
period, the initial asset holdings of a consumer in the North and South are given by AN;0 = ³=(~LNy0)
and AS;0 = (1¡³)=(~LSy0), respectively. By substituting these expressions into Ei and then differentiat-
ing with respect to ¯, we obtain the following expression for the change in logEi caused by an increase
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in ¯:
1
Ei
dEi
d¯
= (1¡ Ái)
µ
¡1
y
dy0
d¯
¶
+ Ái
1
Wi
dWi
d¯
; (48)
where Ái 2 [0; 1] denotes the ratio of labor income to total household wealth in country i; that is,
Ái = Wi=[Ei=(½¡ n)]. In (48), we use y0 ' y because the change in the level of a variable following a
marginal increase in ¯ is infinitesimal. Because the change in logEi is constant over time, the magnitude
of the nominal spending effect is given by the RHS of (48) multiplied by 1=(½¡ n), the sign of which is
ambiguous.
Third, we evaluate the welfare effect through promoting FDI. Given (47), a rise in ¯ increases nF;t
at each point in time from period 0. Therefore, the FDI-promoting effect is clearly nonnegative.
Fourth, we evaluate the welfare effect through raising marginal cost. By using (35), (41), (42), (44),
and (45), we obtain: (1=wS)(dwS;t=d¯) = (1=¯) + (z¯=z) ¡ (y¯=y) + [(y ¡ z¤)(¡z¯)=(zy)]eºt =
f¸~LN ¡ ¹ [(½=n)¡ 1] ~LSgf¯ + ¹ [(½=n)¡ 1]g¡1(¸~LN + ¯ ~LS)¡1 + [(y ¡ z¤) (¡z¯)=(zy)]eºt. The
first term on the RHS of this equation represents the long-run effect on wS;t, the sign of which is
ambiguous. The sign of the second term is positive. Therefore, the sign of dwS;t=d¯ is ambigu-
ous. The welfare effect through raising marginal cost is given by
R1
0 e
¡(½¡n)t(¡d logwS;t=d¯)dt =
¡(1=wS)
R1
0 e
¡(½¡n)t(dwS;t=d¯)dt = ¡1=[(½ ¡ n)WS ](dWS=d¯). The sign of this effect is ambigu-
ous.
Finally, we can derive the welfare effect through reducing competition simply as follows:
R1
0 e
¡(½¡n)t
(¡nF;t=¯)dt = ¡nF =[¯(½¡ n)] < 0. We have used nF;t = nF because the change in nF;t following a
marginal increase in ¯ is infinitesimal. Thus, the competition-reducing effect is negative.
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Appendix C: The Conditions for 0 < nF < 1 and I > 0
In this appendix, we show that we can guarantee 0 < nF < 1 when (¸¡ 1)LS < LN + ½aN holds, and
that I > 0 when ¯ > ¯min holds. Moreover, we show that ¸ > ¯min if (¸¡ 1)(LN + LS) > ½aN .
First, we consider a parameter condition to exclude the equilibrium in which all firms possessing
patents move to the South. If patent protection is sufficiently strong in the South, that is, if ¯ is sufficiently
high (or close to ¸), all firms that succeed in innovation may choose to become multinationals and shift
their production to the South. In this case, no firm engages in production in the North, so that the
proportion of multinationals, nF;t, is equal to unity. In order to exclude such an extreme case, we assume
that (¸¡ 1)LS < LN + ½aN . Once we assume that the values of the parameters satisfy this inequality,
nF is less than unity even under the strictest patent protection in the South (¯ = ¸) from (17).
By contrast, when patent protection is sufficiently weak in the South, that is, when ¯ is sufficiently
low, no firm can conduct R&D (It = 0). Specifically, from (18), innovation rate I takes a value of zero
if and only if:
¯ · ¯min ´ 2¡1(1¡ ¸LN=LS) +
p
2¡2(1¡ ¸LN=LS)2 + ¸(LN + ½aN )=LS :
Furthermore, if ¯min > ¸, no firm conducts R&D even under the strictest patent protection in the
South. In order to exclude such an extreme case, we assume that the values of the parameters satisfy
(¸ ¡ 1)(LN + LS) > ½aN . Once we assume that the values of the parameters satisfy this inequality, I
is positive, at least under ¯ = ¸ from (18).
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Appendix D: Proof of Footnote 24
In this appendix, we prove the assertion in footnote 24. It is sufficient for the proof to show that Ui(¸) is
higher than Ui( ¹¯) for any ¹¯ 2 [1; ¯min] if aN < (¸¡ 1)(LN +LS)2= f[(¸+ 1)(LN + LS) + ¸LS ] ½g.
To verify this, we first compute the welfare of each consumer when there is no innovation; that is,
Ui( ¹¯) for ¹¯ 2 [1; ¯min]. If It = 0, then nF;t = 1¡ ¸LNwS;t holds from (9). Substituting this equation
into (8), we obtain wS = 1=(¸LN+ ¹¯LS) and nF = ¹¯LS=(¸LN+ ¹¯LS) for ¹¯ 2 [1; ¯min]. This implies
that wN = ¸=[ ¹¯(¸LN + ¹¯LS)] for ¹¯ 2 [1; ¯min] because (11) holds even if It = 0. By substituting wS
and wN into (20) and (21), we have:
EN =
³( ¹¯¡ 1)(¸LN + ¹¯LS) + ¸LN
¹¯LN (¸LN + ¹¯LS)
;
ES =
(1¡ ³)( ¹¯¡ 1)(¸LN + ¹¯LS) + ¹¯LS
¹¯LS(¸LN + ¹¯LS)
;
for ¹¯ 2 [1; ¯min]. Thus, from these equations and (25), we can compute Ui( ¹¯) for ¹¯ 2 [1; ¯min] as
follows:
UN ( ¹¯) =
1
½
½
log
³( ¹¯¡ 1)(¸LN + ¹¯LS) + ¸LN
¹¯LN
+
¹¯LS
¸LN + ¹¯LS
¡
log ¸¡ log ¹¯¢¡ log ¸¾ ;
US( ¹¯) =
1
½
½
log
(1¡ ³)( ¹¯¡ 1)(¸LN + ¹¯LS) + ¹¯LS
¹¯LS
+
¹¯LS
¸LN + ¹¯LS
¡
log ¸¡ log ¹¯¢¡ log ¸¾ :
Next, we derive the welfare of each consumer when ¯ = ¸; that is, Ui(¸). Substituting (15) and (16)
into (20) and (21) yields the equilibrium values of each consumer’s spending when ¯ = ¸:
EN =
1
LN + LS + ½aN
µ
³½aN
LN
+ 1
¶
; (49)
ES =
1
LN + LS + ½aN
·
(1¡ ³)½aN
LS
+ 1
¸
: (50)
Therefore, substituting (16)–(18) and (49) into (25) yields:
UN (¸) =
1
½
½
log ¸
½
·
¸¡ 1
¸
LN + LS
aN
¡ ½
¸
¸
+ log
µ
³½aN
LN
+ 1
¶
¡ log ¸
¾
:
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Likewise, from (16)–(18), (25), and (50), we obtain:
US(¸) =
1
½
½
log ¸
½
·
¸¡ 1
¸
LN + LS
aN
¡ ½
¸
¸
+ log
·
(1¡ ³)½aN
LS
+ 1
¸
¡ log ¸
¾
:
Next, we compare Ui( ¹¯) with Ui(¸). By subtracting UN ( ¹¯) from UN (¸), we have:
UN (¸)¡ UN ( ¹¯) = 1
½
½
log ¸
½
·
¸¡ 1
¸
LN + LS
aN
¡ ½
¸
¸
+ log
µ
³½aN
LN
+ 1
¶
¡ log ³(
¹¯¡ 1)(¸LN + ¹¯LS) + ¸LN
¹¯LN
¡
¹¯LS
¸LN + ¹¯LS
¡
log ¸¡ log ¹¯¢¾ : (51)
Note that the sum of the second and third terms in (51) satisfies the following inequality:
log
µ
³½aN
LN
+ 1
¶
¡ log ³(
¹¯¡ 1)(¸LN + ¹¯LS) + ¸LN
¹¯LN
= log
³½aN ¹¯ + ¹¯LN
³( ¹¯¡ 1)(¸LN + ¹¯LS) + ¸LN
¸ log
£
³( ¹¯¡ 1)(¸LN + ¹¯LS) ¹¯=¸
¤
+ ¹¯LN
³( ¹¯¡ 1)(¸LN + ¹¯LS) + ¸LN
= log ¹¯¡ log ¸;
where the inequality on the third line uses the fact that ½aN ¸ ( ¹¯¡1)(¸LN+ ¹¯LS)=¸ must hold because
(¯ ¡ 1)[LN + (¯=¸)LS ]= (¯aN ) ¡ (½=¯) · 0 for ¯ · ¯min from (18). Thus, UN (¸) ¡ UN ( ¹¯) must
satisfy the following inequality for any ¹¯ 2 [1; ¯min]:
UN (¸)¡ UN ( ¹¯) ¸ 1
½
½
log ¸
½
·
¸¡ 1
¸
LN + LS
aN
¡ ½
¸
¸
+ log ¹¯¡ log ¸
¡
¹¯LS
¸LN + ¹¯LS
¡
log ¸¡ log ¹¯¢¾
=
1
½
½
(log ¸)
·
¸¡ 1
¸
LN + LS
½aN
¡ 1
¸
¡ 1¡
¹¯LS
¸LN + ¹¯LS
¸
+(log ¹¯)
µ
1 +
¹¯LS
¸LN + ¹¯LS
¶¾
> 0;
where the last inequality uses the condition that aN < (¸¡1)(LN+LS)2= f[(¸+ 1)(LN + LS) + ¸LS ] ½g.
Therefore, the welfare of each Northern consumer is higher when ¯ = ¸ than when there is no innovation
if aN < (¸¡ 1)(LN + LS)2= f[(¸+ 1)(LN + LS) + ¸LS ] ½g.
We can also show that US(¸) ¡ US( ¹¯) is positive if the condition is satisfied. Subtracting US( ¹¯)
from US(¸) yields:
US(¸)¡ US( ¹¯) = 1
½
½
log ¸
½
·
¸¡ 1
¸
LN + LS
aN
¡ ½
¸
¸
+ log
·
(1¡ ³)½aN
LS
+ 1
¸
¡ log (1¡ ³)(
¹¯¡ 1)(¸LN + ¹¯LS) + ¹¯LS
¹¯LS
¡
¹¯LS
¸LN + ¹¯LS
¡
log ¸¡ log ¹¯¢¾ : (52)
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The sum of the second and third terms in (52) satisfies the following inequality:
log
·
(1¡ ³)½aN
LS
+ 1
¸
¡ log (1¡ ³)(
¹¯¡ 1)(¸LN + ¹¯LS) + ¹¯LS
¹¯LS
= log
(1¡ ³)½aN ¹¯ + ¹¯LS
(1¡ ³)( ¹¯¡ 1)(¸LN + ¹¯LS) + ¹¯LS
¸ log
£
(1¡ ³)( ¹¯¡ 1)(¸LN + ¹¯LS) ¹¯=¸
¤
+ ¹¯LS
(1¡ ³)( ¹¯¡ 1)(¸LN + ¹¯LS) + ¹¯LS
> log ¹¯¡ log ¸;
where the first inequality uses the fact that ½aN ¸ ( ¹¯ ¡ 1)(¸LN + ¹¯LS)=¸ must hold because (¯ ¡
1)[LN + (¯=¸)LS ]= (¯aN ) ¡ (½=¯) · 0 for ¯ · ¯min from (18). Thus, US(¸) ¡ US( ¹¯) must satisfy
the following inequality for any ¹¯ 2 [1; ¯min]:
US(¸)¡ US( ¹¯) > 1
½
½
log ¸
½
·
¸¡ 1
¸
LN + LS
aN
¡ ½
¸
¸
+ log ¹¯¡ log ¸
¡
¹¯LS
¸LN + ¹¯LS
¡
log ¸¡ log ¹¯¢¾
=
1
½
½
(log ¸)
·
¸¡ 1
¸
LN + LS
½aN
¡ 1
¸
¡ 1¡
¹¯LS
¸LN + ¹¯LS
¸
+(log ¹¯)
µ
1 +
¹¯LS
¸LN + ¹¯LS
¶¾
> 0;
where the last inequality uses the condition that aN < (¸¡1)(LN+LS)2= f[(¸+ 1)(LN + LS) + ¸LS ] ½g.
Thus, the welfare of each Southern consumer is higher when ¯ = ¸ than when there is no innovation, if
aN < (¸¡ 1)(LN + LS)2= f[(¸+ 1)(LN + LS) + ¸LS ] ½g.
We have confirmed that when the value of ¯ is so low that no R&D is undertaken, consumer welfare
is not maximized if aN < (¸¡ 1)(LN + LS)2= f[(¸+ 1)(LN + LS) + ¸LS ] ½g.
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Appendix E: The Sufficient Condition of LS for Proposition 3
In this appendix, we show that the condition given in Proposition 3 holds irrespective of LN , if LS
satisfies LS ¸ ¸½aN=[(log ¸)(2¸ ¡ 1)]. From (17) and (19), we can show that f(¸) = log ¸½ dId¯
¯¯
¯=¸
¡
nF
¸ =
log ¸
½
h
1
¸2
³
LN
aN
+ ½
´
+ LS¸aN
i
¡ LSLN+LS+½aN is an increasing function of (LN=aN ) + ½. Because
we focus on the equilibrium in which nF < 1, it follows that (LN=aN )+½ > (¸¡1)LS=aN necessarily
holds. Therefore, if f(¸) ¸ 0 when (LN=aN ) + ½ = (¸ ¡ 1)LS=aN , then f(¸) is necessarily positive
for any value of (LN=aN ) + ½. Substituting (LN=aN ) + ½ = (¸ ¡ 1)LS=aN into f(¸), we find that
f(¸) ¸ 0 holds if LS ¸ ¸½aN= [(log ¸)(2¸¡ 1)] :
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Appendix F: Analysis of the Effects of an R&D Subsidy
In this appendix, we analyze how an R&D subsidy influences the welfare effect of strengthening patent
protection in the South. To do this, we modify our model by incorporating the following three assump-
tions, as stated in the text. First, the Northern government subsidizes entrepreneurs by 100£ sR percent
of R&D costs, where sR 2 [0; 1). Second, the subsidies are financed by a lump-sum tax levied on North-
ern consumers. Third, the Northern government runs a balanced budget at each point in time. Taxation
by the government changes the intertemporal budget constraint of the consumers in country i as follows:Z 1
0
e¡
R t
0 rsdsEi;tdt = Ai;0 +
Z 1
0
e¡
R t
0 rsdswi;tdt¡
Z 1
0
e¡
R t
0 rsdsTi;tdt; (53)
where Ti;t is the amount of tax levied in country i at time t. Note that TS;t is equal to zero because
Southern consumers are not taxed. To achieve the balanced budget, the Northern government must
equalize its revenue and expenditure:
LNTN;t = sRwN;taNIt; (54)
where the LHS represents tax revenues and the RHS represents the subsidy payment, which is equal to
sR times the wage paid to workers engaging in R&D.
The subsidy influences the profitability of R&D because it decreases the costs of R&D for en-
trepreneurs. As a result, the following condition, which is a generalized version of (4), must be satisfied
in equilibrium to ensure nonpositive profit in the R&D process:
vN;t · (1¡ sR)wN;taN with equality if It > 0; (55)
where the LHS represents the expected gain from R&D and the RHS represents the cost of R&D.
Because the zero-profit condition in the R&D sector is influenced by the subsidy, the values of the
endogenous variables also depend on the subsidy rate. Hereafter, we focus on the equilibrium, in which
the innovation rate, It, and production in the North, nN;t = 1 ¡ nF;t, are strictly positive. From the
zero-profit condition (55), the Northern wage is equal to wN;t = vt=[(1 ¡ sR)aN ]. Substituting this
expression, (11), (12), and nN;t = 1¡ nF;t into (9) yields:
It =
LN + (¯=¸)LS
aN
¡ 1¡ sR
¯vt
: (56)
From (3), (7), and (56), the dynamic equation for vt is:
_vt =
·
LN + (¯=¸)LS
aN
+ ½
¸
vt +
sR
¯
¡ 1: (57)
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Because vt is a jump variable, equation (57) shows that vt must jump at the initial time period to the
following steady-state value:
v =
(¯ ¡ sR)aN
¯[LN + (¯=¸)LS + ½aN ]
: (58)
Therefore, from (11), (12), (55) and (56), the other endogenous variables immediately jump to their
steady-state values, as is the case when sR = 0. The steady-state values of wN;t, and wS;t are:
wN =
¯ ¡ sR
(1¡ sR)¯[LN + (¯=¸)LS + ½aN ] ; (59)
wS =
(¯ ¡ sR)=¸
(1¡ sR)[LN + (¯=¸)LS + ½aN ] ; (60)
which reduce respectively to (15) and (16) if sR = 0. Furthermore, by substituting (58) and (60) into
(12) and (56), we have the steady-state values of nF;t and It:
nF =
(¯ ¡ sR)(¯=¸)LS
(1¡ sR)[LN + (¯=¸)LS + ½aN ] ; (61)
I =
¯ ¡ 1
¯ ¡ sR
LN + (¯=¸)LS
aN
¡ (1¡ sR)½
¯ ¡ sR ; (62)
which are equal to (17) and (18) if sR = 0.
Next, we compute the equilibrium value of spending, Ei. From (53) and rt = ½, Ei satisfies the
following relationship:
Ei = ½Ai;0 + wi ¡ Ti; (63)
where TS = 0 and TN = sRwNaNI=LN , both of which are constant over time. Summing the spending
of all consumers yields:
E ´ ENLN + ESLS = ½A0 + (LNwN + LSwS)¡ LNTN = 1; (64)
where A0 ´ AN;0LN + AS;0LS , and the last equality holds because of the normalization that Et = 1
for all t. By substituting (64) into (63), we can represent Ei as follows:
EN = ³
1¡ wSLS
LN
+ (1¡ ³)(wN ¡ TN );
ES = (1¡ ³)1¡ (wN ¡ TN )LN
LS
+ ³wS ; (65)
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where ³ ´ AN;0LN=A0.
In this extended model, as in the original model, strengthening patent protection in the South af-
fects the welfare of the South through the five channels shown in (26). First, increasing patent breadth
increases welfare through enhancing innovation. The magnitude of this innovation-enhancing effect is
given by:
log ¸
½2
dI
d¯
=
log ¸
½2
·
1¡ sR
(¯ ¡ sR)2
µ
LN
aN
+ ½
¶
+
LS
¸aN
(¯ ¡ sR)(¯ ¡ 1) + ¯(1¡ sR)
(¯ ¡ sR)2
¸
> 0: (66)
Note that the magnitude of the innovation-enhancing effect tends to be an inverted U-shaped function of
sR. This can be shown by partially differentiating dI=d¯ with respect to sR as follows:
@2I
@sR@¯
=
¡sR [(2¯ ¡ 1)LS + ¸(LN + ½aN )] + ¯LS + (2¡ ¯)¸(LN + ½aN )
¸aN (¯ ¡ sR)3 : (67)
Because ¯ < 2¯ ¡ 1 and 2 ¡ ¯ < 1, @2I@sR@¯ is positive if and only if sR is less than a critical value:
s^R ´ [¯LS + (2 ¡ ¯)¸(LN + ½aN )]= [(2¯ ¡ 1)LS + ¸(LN + ½aN )]. Therefore, dI=d¯ is increasing
with sR if sR < s^R, and is decreasing with sR if sR > s^R.
Second, increasing patent breadth raises the welfare of the South through raising nominal spending.
Third, increasing patent breadth decreases welfare through raising the marginal cost of production. To
examine the magnitude of the sum of these two effects, it is useful to compute ES=wS . By substituting
(54), (59), (60), and (62) into (65), we obtain:
ES
wS
= 1 + (1¡ sR)(1¡ ³)¸½aN
¯LS
: (68)
Therefore, differentiating the logarithm of (68) with respect to ¯ yields the sum of the nominal spending
effect and the marginal cost effect as follows:
1
½
µ
1
ES
dES
d¯
¡ 1
wS
dwS
d¯
¶
= ¡ (1¡ sR)(1¡ ³)
[¯LS=(¸½aN ) + (1¡ sR)(1¡ ³)]¯½ < 0: (69)
Equation (69) shows that 1½
³
1
ES
dES
d¯ ¡ 1wS
dwS
d¯
´
is increasing with sR:
@
@sR
·
1
½
µ
1
ES
@ES
@¯
¡ 1
wS
@wS
@¯
¶¸
=
(1¡ ³)LS=(¸½aN )
[¯LS=(¸½aN ) + (1¡ sR)(1¡ ³)]2½ > 0: (70)
Fourth, increasing patent breadth raises welfare through promoting FDI. By differentiating (61) with
respect to ¯, we can derive the magnitude of the FDI-promoting effect:
(log ¸¡ log ¯)
½
d¹nF
d¯
=
(log ¸¡ log ¯)(¯=¸)LS
(1¡ sR)[LN + (¯=¸)LS + ½aN ]½
·
2¡ (¯=¸)LS + (sR=¯)(LN + ½aN )
LN + (¯=¸)LS + ½aN
¸
¸ 0: (71)
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By partially differentiating d¹nF =d¯ with respect to sR, we obtain:
@2¹nF
@sR@¯
=
(¯=¸)LS
(1¡ sR)2[LN + (¯=¸)LS + ½aN ]
·
2¡ (¯=¸)LS + (1=¯)(LN + ½aN )
LN + (¯=¸)LS + ½aN
¸
> 0: (72)
Therefore, the FDI-promoting effect is increasing with sR.
Fifth, increasing patent breadth lowers welfare through the competition-reducing effect. From (61),
the magnitude of the competition-reducing effect is given by:
¡nF
¯½
= ¡ (¯ ¡ sR)(1=¸)LS
(1¡ sR)[LN + (¯=¸)LS + ½aN ]½ < 0: (73)
This equation shows that the competition-reducing effect is decreasing with sR:
@
@sR
µ
¡nF
¯½
¶
= ¡ (¯ ¡ 1)(1=¸)LS
(1¡ sR)2[LN + (¯=¸)LS + ½aN ]½ < 0: (74)
In summary, the effect of strengthening patent protection on welfare in the South is represented by
substituting (66), (69), (71), and (73) into (26).
The marginal effect of the R&D subsidy on the welfare effect of stronger patent protection is rather
complex and not necessarily monotonic. As shown in (67), the R&D subsidy increases the positive
innovation-enhancing effect for sR < s^R, but decreases it for sR > s^R. In addition, as shown in (70)
and (72), the R&D subsidy lessens the combined nominal spending and marginal cost effects, which
are negative, but also increases the positive FDI-promoting effect. However, the subsidy exacerbates the
negative competition-reducing effect, as shown in (74). The total marginal effect of the R&D subsidy is
given by the net effect of these changes.
According to our numerical analysis, whether the introduction of an R&D subsidy gives the South
an incentive to raise its patent protection to the maximum is ambiguous. For some parameter values,
the introduction of an R&D subsidy might increase the marginal welfare effect of strengthening patent
protection. For example, suppose that aN = 103, ¸ = 1:4, LN = 1, LS = 12, ½ = 0:05, and
³ = 0:6. In this case, dUS(¸)d¯ < 0 and the South’s optimal patent breadth is less than ¸ if sR = 0 (Figure
1). However, because @2US(¯)@sR@¯
¯¯¯
sR=0
> 0 in this case, the Northern government can induce the South
to strengthen its patent protection indirectly by introducing an R&D subsidy. In fact, if the Northern
government subsidizes R&D by 10 percent of costs (sR = 0:1), the sign of dUS(¸)d¯ becomes positive and
maximum patent protection becomes optimal for the South (Figure 2). By contrast, if aN = 85, ¸ = 2,
LN = 4, LS = 0:5, ½ = 0:05, and ³ = 0:7, dUS(¸)d¯ < 0 for any sR 2 [0; 1) (see Figure 3). Therefore, in
this case, the strongest patent protection is suboptimal for the South no matter what the subsidy rate.
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Figure 1: Patent breadth and the welfare of the South: the case of aN = 103, ¸ = 1:4, LN = 1, LS = 12,
½ = 0:05, ³ = 0:6, sR = 0. Note that ¯min ' 1:397 in this case.
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Figure 2: Patent breadth and the welfare of the South: the case of aN = 103, ¸ = 1:4, LN = 1, LS = 12,
½ = 0:05, ³ = 0:6, sR = 0:1. Note that ¯min ' 1:365 in this case.
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Figure 3: Subsidy rates and the marginal effects of changing patent breadth at the maximum patent
protection ¯ = ¸: the case of aN = 85, ¸ = 2, LN = 4, LS = 0:5, ½ = 0:05, ³ = 0:7. It is required that
sR < 0:939 for nF < 1.
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Appendix G: Proof of º < ¡n
In this appendix, we show that º < ¡n. The characteristic equation of the Jacobian matrix, J , of the
dynamic system (43) is given by the following quadratic equation:
F (x) ´ x2 ¡
h
¡¹~L(¯)z + y
i
x¡
µ
1¡ 1
¯
¶
¹~L(¯)zy = 0:
By the definition of F , we have:
F (¡n) = n2 +
h
¡¹~L(¯)z + y
i
n¡
µ
1¡ 1
¯
¶
¹~L(¯)zy: (75)
From (38), ¹~L(¯)z = n+ (¹y=¯) holds on the BGP. Substituting this and (40) into (75) yields:
F (¡n) = n2 +
·
¡n¡ 1
¯
¹y + y
¸
n¡
µ
1¡ 1
¯
¶µ
n+
1
¯
¹y
¶
y
= ¡
·
(¹¡ ¯)n+ (¯ ¡ 1)
µ
n+
1
¯
¹y
¶¸
1
¯
y
= ¡
·
(¹¡ 1)n+ ¯ ¡ 1
¯
¹y
¸
1
¯
y
= ¡
·
n¡ n
¹
+
µ
n
¹
+ ½¡ n
¶¸
1
¯
¹y
= ¡½ 1
¯
¹y
< 0:
This result proves that º < ¡n because º is the negative root of the quadratic equation F (x) = 0.
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Appendix H: Proof of Proposition 7
In this appendix, we prove Proposition 7 by deriving the parameter values at which the total welfare
effect is positive.
For that purpose, we first decompose the sum of the nominal spending effect and the marginal
cost effect into parts that can each be signed. Because WS = ¯WN=¸ holds from (35), we obtain
(1=WS) (dWS=d¯) = (1=WN ) (dWN=d¯) + (1=¯). Using this and (48), we can rewrite the sum of the
nominal spending effect and the marginal cost effect for Northern households as follows:Z 1
0
e¡(½¡n)t
³d logEN
d¯
¡ d logwS;t
d¯
´
dt
=
1
½¡ n(1¡ ÁN )
µ
¡1
y
dy0
d¯
¡ 1
WN
dWN
d¯
¶
¡ 1
¯(½¡ n) ; (76)
where 0 · 1 ¡ ÁN · 1 by the definition of Ái. Likewise, the corresponding expression for Southern
households is: Z 1
0
e¡(½¡n)t
³d logES
d¯
¡ d logwS;t
d¯
´
dt
=
1
½¡ n(1¡ ÁS)
µ
¡1
y
dy0
d¯
¡ 1
WN
dWN
d¯
¶
¡ (1¡ ÁS) 1
¯(½¡ n) ; (77)
where 0 · 1¡ ÁS · 1. The second terms on the RHS of (76) and (77) are negative. Meanwhile, we can
compute (1=WN ) (dWN=d¯) in the first terms on the RHS of (76) and (77) as follows:
1
WN
dWN
d¯
=
½¡ n
wN
Z 1
0
e¡(½¡n)t
dwN;t
d¯
dt
= (½¡ n)y
z
Z 1
0
e¡(½¡n)t
·
z¯
y
¡
1¡ eºt¢¡ z
y2
¡
y¯ ¡ z¯¤eºt
¢¸
dt
=
z¯
z
µ
1¡ ½¡ n
½¡ n¡ º
¶
¡ y¯
y
+
z¯
y
¤
½¡ n
½¡ n¡ º ;
where the second equality uses (35), (44) and (45). From this and (45), we have:
¡1
y
dy0
d¯
¡ 1
WN
dWN
d¯
= ¡1
y
(y¯ ¡ z¯¤)¡ z¯
z
µ
1¡ ½¡ n
½¡ n¡ º
¶
+
y¯
y
¡ z¯
y
¤
½¡ n
½¡ n¡ º
= (y ¡ z¤) ¡z¯
zy
µ
1¡ ½¡ n
½¡ n¡ º
¶
> 0;
where the inequality holds because y ¡ z¤ = ¡¯(º + n)=¹ > 0 and º < 0. Consequently, the first
terms on the RHS of (76) and (77) are positive. This implies that the sum of the nominal spending effect
and the marginal cost effect is necessarily greater than or equal to ¡1=[¯(½¡ n)].
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If the innovation-enhancing effect outweighs the sum of the competition-reducing effect and 1=[¯(½¡
n)], the total welfare effect for Northern households is positive. This is because the FDI-promoting ef-
fect is nonnegative. Further, in this case, the total welfare effect for Southern households is also positive
from (34) and (77). Hence, a rise in ¯ improves welfare in both the North and the South if the following
inequality holds:µ
1
½¡ n ¡
1
½¡ n¡ º
¶µ
log ¸
¹
¶µ¡z¯
z
¶
| {z }
innovation-enhancing effect
>
nF
¯(½¡ n)| {z }
competition-reducing effect
+
1
¯(½¡ n)| {z }
the negative part in the sum
of nominal spending effect
and marginal cost effect
: (78)
Because ¡n ¡ º > 0 as shown in Appendix G, (78) holds if
³
1
½¡n ¡ 1½
´³
log ¸
¹
´³¡z¯
z
´
> nF¯(½¡n) +
1
¯(½¡n) . This inequality can be rewritten as:
n
½
log ¸
¹
>
nF + 1
¯
µ
z
¡z¯
¶
: (79)
Substituting (37), (40), and (41) into the RHS of (79) yields:
nF + 1
¯
µ
z
¡z¯
¶
=
8<:1¡
"
¯ + (¯ ¡ 1) (¯=¸)
~LS
~L(¯)
­(¯)
#¡19=;­(¯);
where ­(¯) = ¯+¹[(½=n)¡1]1+¹[(½=n)¡1] . Because ­(¯) is an increasing function of ¯, the RHS of (79) is an
increasing function of ¯. Therefore, if inequality (79) holds at ¯ = ¸, inequality (79) holds for all
¯ 2 (1; ¸]. Consequently, we can show that a rise in ¯ improves welfare in both the North and the South
if (79) holds at ¯ = ¸.
Substituting ¯ = ¸ into (79) and then rewriting the resultant expression yields:
­(¸)
¸+ (¸¡ 1) ~LS­(¸)
> ­(¸)¡ n
½
log ¸
¹
; (80)
where we use ~L(¸) = ~LN + ~LS = 1. This implies that inequality (79) holds irrespective of ~LS if
n
½
log ¸
¹
> ­(¸): (81)
If the parameters do not satisfy (81), we can rewrite (80) as follows:
~LS <
·
¸
¸¡ 1
n
½
log ¸
¹
¡ ­(¸)
¸ ·
­(¸)¡ n
½
log ¸
¹
¸¡1
[­(¸)]¡1 : (82)
The set of values of ~LS that satisfies (82) becomes empty if ¸, n=½, and ¹ do not satisfy ¸n(log ¸)= [(¸¡ 1) ½] >
¹­(¸). However, assuming that ¹ is sufficiently low ensures that ¸n(log ¸)= [(¸¡ 1) ½] > ¹­(¸) be-
cause ¹­(¸) = ¹+ ¸¡1(1=¹)+(½=n)¡1 is an increasing function of ¹.
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Thus, if ¸, n=½, and ¹ satisfy (81), or if ~LS satisfies (82), strengthening patent protection in the South
improves the welfare of Northern and Southern households.
The result shows that the inequality is more likely to hold the lower is ~LS . Why is this? From (46),
the smaller is ~LS , the weaker is the positive effect on innovation in the short run. This is because a
decrease in ~LS lowers ¡z¯=z from (40) and (41). Thus, the lower is ~LS , the weaker is the innovation-
enhancing effect. On the other hand, from (37) and (40), the smaller is ~LS , the lower is the measure
of multinationals, nF and, thus, the weaker is the competition-reducing effect. Despite the fact that
the smaller is ~LS , the weaker are the positive and negative welfare effects, the weakening of the latter
outweighs the weakening of the former. This can be verified by the fact that the RHS of (79) is an
increasing function of ~LS . Hence, the lower is ~LS , the more the positive welfare effect outweighs the
negative welfare effect.
– 51 –
References
[1] Dinopoulos, E., Kottaridi, C., 2008. The growth effects of national patent policies. Review of
International Economics 16, 499–515.
[2] Dinopoulos, E., Segerstrom, P., 1999. A Schumpeterian model of protection and relative wages.
American Economic Review 89, 450–472.
[3] Dinopoulos, E., Segerstrom, P., 2010. Intellectual property rights, multinational firms and eco-
nomic growth. Journal of Development Economics 92, 13–27.
[4] Dinopoulos, E., Syropoulos, C., 2007. Rent protection as a barrier to innovation and growth.
Economic Theory 32, 309–332.
[5] Dinopoulos, E., Thompson, P., 1998. Schumpeterian growth without scale effects. Journal of
Economic Growth 3, 313–335.
[6] Eicher, T., Garcı´a-Pen˜alosa, C., 2008. Endogenous strength of intellectual property rights: impli-
cations for economic development and growth. European Economic Review 52, 237–258.
[7] Futagami, K., Iwaisako, T., 2007. Dynamic analysis of patent policy in an endogenous growth
model. Journal of Economic Theory 132, 306–334.
[8] Futagami, K., Iwaisako, T., Tanaka, H., 2007. Innovation, licensing, and imitation: the effects of
intellectual property rights protection and industrial policy. Discussion Papers In Economics And
Business 07-05, Osaka University, Osaka, Japan.
[9] Gilbert, R., Shapiro, C., 1990. Optimal patent length and breadth. RAND Journal of Economics
21, 106–112.
[10] Glass, A. J., Saggi, K., 2002. Intellectual property rights and foreign direct investment. Journal of
International Economics 56, 387–410.
[11] Glass, A. J., Wu, X., 2007. Intellectual property rights and quality improvement. Journal of De-
velopment Economics 82, 393–415.
[12] Goh, A.-T., Olivier, J., 2002. Optimal patent protection in a two-sector economy. International
Economic Review 43, 1191–1214.
– 52 –
[13] Grieben, W.-H., 2005. A Schumpeterian North–South growth model of trade and wage inequality.
Review of International Economics 13, 106–128.
[14] Grieben, W.-H., S¸ener, F., 2009. Globalization, rent protection institutions, and going alone in
freeing trade. European Economic Review 53, 1042–1065.
[15] Grinols, E., Lin, H. C., 2006. Global patent protection: channels of north and south welfare gain.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 30, 205–227.
[16] Grossman, G. M., Helpman, E., 1991. Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy. The MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA.
[17] Grossman, G. M., Lai, E. L.-C., 2004. International protection of intellectual property. American
Economic Review 94, 1635–1653.
[18] Gustafsson, P., Segerstrom, P., 2010. North–South trade with increasing product variety. Journal
of Development Economics 92, 97–106.
[19] Helpman, E., 1993. Innovation, imitation, and intellectual property rights. Econometrica 61, 1247–
1280.
[20] Iwaisako, T., Futagami, K., 2003. Patent policy in an endogenous growth model. Journal of Eco-
nomics (Zeitschrift fu¨r Nationalo¨konomie) 78, 239–258.
[21] Judd, K. L., 1985. On the performance of patents. Econometrica 53, 567–585.
[22] Kwan, Y. K., Lai, E. L.-C., 2003. Intellectual property rights protection and endogenous economic
growth. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 27, 853–873.
[23] Lai, E. L.-C., 1998. International intellectual property rights protection and the rate of product
innovation. Journal of Development Economics 55, 133–153.
[24] Lee, J.-Y., Mansfield, E., 1996. Intellectual property protection and U.S. foreign direct investment.
Review of Economics and Statistics 78, 181–186.
[25] Li, C.-W., 2001. On the policy implications of endogenous technological progress. Economic
Journal 111, 164–179.
[26] Maskus, K. E., 2000. Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy. Institute for Interna-
tional Economics, Washington, DC.
– 53 –
[27] McCalman, P., 2001. Reaping what you sow: an empirical analysis of international patent harmo-
nization. Journal of International Economics 55, 161–186.
[28] Mondal, D., Gupta, M. R., 2008. Innovation, imitation and multinationalisation in a North–South
model: a theoretical note. Journal of Economics (Zeitschrift fu¨r Nationalo¨konomie) 94, 31–62.
[29] O’Donoghue, T., Zweimu¨ller, J., 2004. Patents in a model of endogenous growth. Journal of
Economic Growth 9, 81–123.
[30] Park, W. G., 2008. International patent protection: 1960–2005. Research Policy 37, 761–766.
[31] Park, W. G., Lippoldt, D., 2005. International licensing and the strengthening of intellectual prop-
erty rights in developing countries during the 1990s. OECD Economic Studies 40, 7–48.
[32] Segerstrom, P. S., 1998. Endogenous growth without scale effects. American Economic Review
88, 1290–1310.
[33] S¸ener, F., 2008. R&D policies, endogenous growth and scale effects. Journal of Economic Dy-
namics and Control 32, 3895–3916.
[34] Tanaka, H., Iwaisako, T., Futagami, K., 2007. Dynamic analysis of innovation and international
transfer of technology through licensing. Journal of International Economics 73, 189–212.
[35] Vishwasrao, S., 1994. Intellectual property rights and the mode of technology transfer. Journal of
Development Economics 44, 381–402.
[36] Yang, G., Maskus, K. E., 2001a. Intellectual property rights and licensing: an econometric inves-
tigation. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 137, 58–79.
[37] Yang, G., Maskus, K. E., 2001b. Intellectual property rights, licensing, and innovation in an en-
dogenous product-cycle model. Journal of International Economics 53, 169–187.
[38] ˇZigic´, K., 1998. Intellectual property rights violations and spillovers in North–South trade. Euro-
pean Economic Review 42, 1779–1799.
– 54 –
